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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper features an interdisciplinary debate and dialogue about the nature of 
mind, perception, and rationality. Scholars from a range of disciplines—cognitive 
science, applied and experimental psychology, behavioral economics, biology and 
physiology—offer critiques and commentaries of a target article by Felin, 
Koenderink and Krueger (2017), “Rationality, perception, and the all-seeing eye,” 
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review. The commentaries raise a number of criticisms 
and issues about rationality and the all-seeing eye argument, including: the nature 
of judgment and reasoning, biases versus heuristics, organism-environment 
relations, perception and situational construal, equilibrium analysis in economics, 
efficient markets, and the nature of empirical observation and the scientific method. 
The debated topics have far-reaching consequences for the rationality literature 
specifically and the cognitive, psychological and economic sciences more broadly. 
The commentaries are followed by a response by the authors of the target article. 
The response is organized around three central issues: 1) the problem of cues, 2) 
what is the question? and 3) equilibria, $500 bills, and the axioms of rationality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The cognitive sciences, psychology and economics are intimately linked in their interest in 
rationality. Foundational to most conceptions of rationality, judgment, and reasoning is a 
particular view of perception. For example, Herbert Simon’s (1955, 1956) pioneering work 
on the boundedness of rationality—as an alternative to the omniscience of agents in 
economics—builds on this view of perception and vision. And the subsequent cognitive and 
behavioral revolution in psychology and economics, and particularly the work of 
Kahneman and Tversky, further emphasizes these perceptual foundations (see Kahneman, 
2003, 2011). Simon and Kahneman’s research on bounded rationality has influenced and 
reverberated across cognitive and decision science, psychology, computer science, law, and 
economics (e.g., Camerer, 1998, 1999; Conlisk, 1996; Evans, 2002; Gershman et al., 2015; 
Hills et al., 2015; Jolls et al., 1998; Jones, 1999; Korobkin, 2015; Luan et al., 2014; Payne 
et al., 1992; Puranam et al., 2015; Simon, 1980, 1990; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003; 
Williamson, 1985). 
 
Felin, Koenderink and Krueger (2017, henceforth “Felin et al”) argue that much of this 
work—which has challenged the assumption of agent omniscience—builds on a 
theoretically problematic and empirically flawed conception of rationality and perception, 
what they call an “all-seeing eye.” Felin et al use familiar visual tasks and experiments as 
examples and show how assuming this all-seeing eye has led to wrong interpretations not 
just of rationality, but about human nature and mind as well. Felin et al suggest an 
alternative view of perception, drawing on biology, psychology, and the vision sciences. 
The authors also discuss some ways forward, by focusing on the multifarious nature of both 
perception and rationality.   
 
This article features commentaries on the target article by Felin et al. As noted by 
Gigerenzer and Selten, “visions of rationality do not respect disciplinary boundaries” (2001: 
1). The commentaries are by scholars from varied disciplines, including cognitive science, 
psychology, behavioral economics, biology and physiology. Among the issues raised are 
matters such the nature of judgment and reasoning, biases versus heuristics, organism-
environment relations, perception and situational construal, equilibrium analysis in 
economics, efficient markets, and the nature of empirical observation and the scientific 
method. The commentators debate, critique and discuss central aspects of rationality and 
the all-seeing eye argument. The tone ranges from severely critical to complementary and 
supportive. Overall the commentaries can be seen as a debate that vets many of the key 
issues and assumptions at the forefront of the rationality, perception and cognition 
literatures. 
 
By way of background, the commentators have done pioneering work in an array of areas 
related to rationality, reasoning and cognition. For example, Nick Chater and Mike 
Oaksford (2007) have made high-profile contributions to our understanding of Bayesian 
rationality, and more recently to our understanding of reasoning and mental representation 
(Chater and Oaksford, 2013). David Funder (1988) is a central contributor to the person-
situation debate in psychology, and more recently has developed a model of situational 
construal and perception (Funder, 2016; Rauthmann et al., 2015). Gerd Gigerenzer is a 
founding father of the heuristics literature that questions existing understandings of 
cognitive biases (Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Group, 1999). Related to this, he has also 
pioneered models ecological rationality (e.g., Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Todd and 
Gigerenzer, 2012). Denis Noble’s (2008) work has focused on epigenetics, evolution and 
developmental biology and physiology, and more recently the idea of biological relativism 
(Noble, 2016). Keith Stanovich’s research has focused on dual-process models of 
rationality and mind (e.g., Evans and Stanovich, 2013), on individual differences in 
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reasoning (Stanovich, 1999), and he has recently developed a so-called “rationality 
quotient” to test rationality and reasoning in humans (Stanovich, 2016). Barry Schwartz 
(2004; Grant and Schwartz, 2012) has written extensively about decision making, and 
recently asked questions about the nature of rationality (Schwartz, 2015). And finally, Peter 
Todd has done pioneering work on heuristics and adaptive or ecological rationality with 
Gigerenzer, along with recently developing general models of rationality and search (e.g., 
Hills et al., 2015; Todd et al., 2012; Todd and Brighton, 2016).  
 
It is worth noting that it is not just the literatures on rationality, cognition and mind that are 
infused and laden with perception-related issues and assumptions—so are the rest of the 
sciences. For example, theories of consciousness and philosophy of mind inevitably anchor 
on particular views of perception (e.g., Block, 2014; Chalmers, 1996; Feyerabend, 1975; 
Noë, 2004), as do theories of rationality and perception (Siegel, 2017), and theories of 
aesthetics and art (Grootenboer, 2013; Hyman, 2006). All-seeing assumptions about 
perception and observation are also readily evident in equilibrium models in economics 
(Frank and Bernanke, 2003; Frydman and Phelps, 2001; Muth, 1961). Arguably perception 
is at the very center of science itself; after all, theories are empirically tested through some 
manner of perceptual or observational means, where varied scientific tools and perception-
enhancing instruments are utilized to make observations and to gather evidence (cf. Bell, 
1990). Therefore this discussion also has inevitable reverberations and links with various “-
isms” in the philosophy of science, including different forms of realism, objectivism, 
idealism and relativism (Dreyfus and Taylor, 2015; Haack, 2011; Van Fraassen, 2008).  
 
Overall our hope is that this debate will contribute to an interdisciplinary awareness and 
discussion about the nature of perception, as it relates to rationality, mind, judgment 
cognition, and beyond. Each of the seven commentaries serve as subsections for this article. 
The commentaries can be found below (alphabetically by first author), after which the 
target article authors respond to some of the central issues raised by the commentaries.  
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FUNCTIONAL AND EQUILIBRIUM EXPLANATION: TWO ROLES FOR 
RATIONALITY IN THE COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
Nick Chater and Mike Oaksford 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Felin, Koenderink and Krueger (2017, henceforth “Felin et al”) provide a wide-ranging 
examination of some of the hidden assumptions in the rational explanation of perception, 
judgment and decision-making, and economics. This commentary argues that researchers 
across the biological and social sciences are right to seek rational explanation, and that the 
usefulness of such explanation need not depend on the assumption of an “all-seeing eye,” as 
Felin et al suppose. In particular, this article distinguished between two types of rational 
explanation: equilibrium explanations that depend on coherence relations between beliefs, 
preferences and actions (the style of explanation prevalent in economics) and functional 
explanations which optimize an externally defined information processing problem 
(prevalent in explanations of perception). Felin et al’s concerns about the “all-seeing eye” 
apply only to the latter. But we argue that, despite these concerns, such explanations are of 
vital importance and are no more problematic than the functional explanation that is 
ubiquitous in biology. 
 
Rational explanations of thought and behaviour are central to our common sense 
understanding of each other’s behaviour (e.g., Fodor, 1987; Bratman, 1987), fundamental to 
explanation in economics and the social sciences (Binmore, 2008), and underpin 
information processing accounts of cognition (Anderson, 1990, 1991; Anderson & 
Schooler, 1991; Oaksford & Chater, 1998, 2007; Tenenbaum, Griffiths & Kemp, 2006; 
Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths & Goodman, 2011). Felin et al identify what they see as a 
crucial hidden assumption underlying much rational explanation, focusing particularly on 
the domains of perception and of judgement and decision-making. They argue that “the 
cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is 
characterized by an ‘all-seeing eye’” (Felin et al: 1). 
 
We take the essence of this idea to be the assumption that there is an objective, absolute, 
“view from nowhere” (Nagel, 1989) of relevant aspects of the physical or social world; and 
that the theorist must adopt this Archimedean standpoint to provide a commentary and 
critique on observed thought and behavior. In particular, Felin et al suggest, advocates and 
detractors of rational models of human decision-making and perception implicitly assume 
that “rationally correct” performance can be judged from an objective standpoint of this 
kind.  
 
Theorists differ concerning whether human rationality is a glass half-full or half-empty. 
Rational choice theorists in the social sciences and proponents of Bayesian models of 
perception and cognition focus on cases in which human thought and behavior matches up 
well with rational standards. By contrast, those who focus primarily on the limits of 
rationality, whether in the study of human reasoning, judgment and decision-making, or 
behavioral economics, use this presumed objective standpoint as an external standard 
against which our behavior can be measured and found wanting. Felin et al argue that an 
objective “all-seeing eye” may be a mirage--- and that, in consequence, that debates on 
rationality and social sciences may need to be substantially rethought. 
 
In this article, we argue that rational explanation need not, and typically does not, rely on a 
hidden assumption of the existence of an “all-seeing eye.” Our argument has four steps. 
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First, in Functional versus equilibrium explanation, we distinguish two very different styles 
of explanation. Second, in Rationality in functional and equilibrium explanation, we 
describe how rationality can play a role in these two very different styles of explanation. 
Third, in The all-seeing-eye in rational explanation, we argue that Felin et al’s critical 
arguments apply only to rational functional explanation (which is prevalent in vision 
research) but not to the rational equilibrium explanation (which is prevalent in the field of 
judgment and decision making). Fourth, in The scope and limits of rational functional 
explanation, we argue that while Felin et al are right to point out potentially strong 
assumptions in the application of rational functional explanation (e.g., as used in rational 
models of perception), that the scope for such explanation is nonetheless very large. Indeed, 
just as with conventional functional explanation in biology, the rational functional 
explanation of cognitive processes has considerable explanatory power.  
 
Functional versus Equilibrium Explanation 
 
Explanation in many aspects of the biological sciences is paradigmatically functional 
(Tinbergen, 1963). The heart has the function of pumping blood; arteries and veins have the 
function of diffusing oxygen and nutrients efficiently through the body; the lungs have the 
function of efficiently exchanging oxygen and carbon dioxide. And functional explanation 
extends to the microscopic scale: the cell wall has the function of maintaining a stable 
chemical environment; the myelin sheath around nerve axons has the function of preventing 
the dissipation of the electrical pulse created by depolarization; synapses have the role of 
linking together of nerve cells, perhaps in a way that can be adjusted through experience, 
and so on. Each of these functional explanations is partial. As with explanation in most 
domains, functional explanations can be made increasingly nuanced and sophisticated, 
taking account, for example, of multiple competing functions, and constraints from 
ontogeny and phylogeny, as well as physics and chemistry. Biology is functional through 
and through: each element of a biological system is understood, in part at least, as 
contributing to the successful operation of a larger system of which it is a component.  
 
Explanation in microeconomics is, by contrast, paradigmatically focussed on equilibrium, 
not function. Prices are set so that supply balances demand. Consumers are presumed to 
distribute their spending so that the marginal utility of an extra dollar is in precise balance 
across a variety of goods; similarly, companies are presumed to distribute their resources to 
land, machinery, labour and so on, so that the marginal impact of each extra dollar spent on 
these various factors of production is precisely in balance (e.g., Kreps, 1990). In the same 
way, in finance theory, each stock and bond price is presumed to reflect the same balance 
between risk and return (Sharpe, 1964). In each of these cases, the focus is bringing the 
parts of a single system into equilibrium: whether it be trade between buyers and sellers; 
consumer spending across different categories, company investment across factors of 
production, or prices across the stock market. 
 
Functional and equilibrium explanation are profoundly different. Functional explanation 
sees the system under study as having a role in a larger system; and explains the properties 
of the system under study by reference to the degree to which it successfully performs this 
role. So, for example, the heart is seen as playing the crucial role of pumping blood through 
the body; the circulatory system, more broadly, is itself seen as having a role in the 
processes of respiration and digestion; these in turn are seen as critical to supporting the 
physiological processes, neural function, and behavior of the organism. From the 
perspective of natural selection, the chain of functional explanation may, arguable, be 
grounded in an “overarching” goal of maximizing inclusive fitness, that is, the function of 
maximizing the rate of reproduction of individuals, or more accurately the genes from 
which they are constructed (Dawkins, 1976; Hamilton, 1964). Crucially, explaining a 
system by its function requires holding that system to a standard which can be defined from 
outside the system itself.  
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Equilibrium explanation, by contrast, focuses not on the degree to which a system carries 
out some externally defined function, but rather on bringing into balance the components 
within the system itself. The focus of interest is not external “success,” but internal balance 
or coherence. Often, where the system is assumed to be near equilibrium, the question of 
interest is the extent to which equilibrium can help predict the direction in which the system 
will change over time. For example, equilibrium explanation in economics links together 
prices of crude oil, petroleum, diesel, and indirectly other sources of energy, as well as to 
the valuations of oil companies, motor manufacturers and so on. Thus, if there is a shock to 
the supply or likely future availability of crude oil and a consequent spike in the crude oil 
price, the price system is assumed to transmit this shock throughout the economy to set 
prices in a new equilibrium.  
 
Rationality in Functional and Equilibrium Explanation 
 
Crucially for Felin et al’s discussion, rational explanations can have both functional and 
equilibrium form. Rational functional explanation arises where the function of interest is 
not a physical or chemical process, as in digestion or respiration, but an information 
processing function, whether making arithmetic calculations, understanding speech, 
interpreting sensory input, or controlling the motor system. Such explanation involves the 
theorist taking an external standpoint, and creating an “ideal” rational model which 
addresses with the problem the theorist takes to be faced by the agent: its goal, 
environment, and perhaps its cognitive limitations (Anderson, 1990, 1991). The hope is that 
the predictions of the ideal model will fit, to some degree, with observed behavior. The 
external standpoint is exemplified in behavioural ecology (Krebs & Davies, 1978), Marr’s 
(1982) computational level of explanation, rational models of memory, categorization and 
reasoning (Anderson, 1990, 1991; Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 1998; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 
2001), “ideal observer” models of perception (e.g., Geisler, 2011; Yuille & Kersten, 2006), 
Bayesian theories of perception and motor control (e.g., Körding, & Wolpert, 2006; Yuille 
& Kersten, 2006) and ideal models in language processing or acquisition (e.g., Chater & 
Manning, 2006; Pinker, 1979; Vitányi & Chater, 2016). In rational functional explanation, 
there is a well-defined information processing task to be performed that can characterized 
from outside the system; the rational functional model provides an optimal solution 
performing that task.  
 
Note that, as with functional explanation more broadly, rational functional explanation does 
not require that the organism as a whole is fully optimal or close to optimal with respect to 
any externally defined function. Indeed, functional explanations typically involve local 
rather than global optimization. Thus, optics of the eye seems locally fairly optimal, in the 
sense that any small change to the structure of the lens, the cornea or the retina is likely to 
lead to poorer, rather than better, optics; but there is no implication that the vertebrate eye, 
considered as a whole, is somehow the “ideal” optical system. Similarly, the rational 
functional explanation of animal foraging typically assumes that a local change to foraging 
patterns (e.g., switching “patches” more or less frequently) should not be advantageous; but 
there is no implication that the agent has achieved, in some sense, the ideal possible 
foraging method.  
 
The all-seeing eye of Felin et al seems, to a degree, to be implicated in functional rational 
explanations; and, as we discuss further below, Felin et al are right to point out there are 
many aspects of perception and cognition for which there is no meaningful “objective” goal 
being optimised or “true” description of the world that must be extracted.  
 
Felin et al’s concerns about the “all-seeing eye” do not, though, apply to rational 
equilibrium explanation. In equilibrium explanation, the theorist does not attempt to stand 
outside the cognitive system under study. Rather than taking the nature of the problem 
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faced by the agent as the starting point for analysis, equilibrium explanations takes the 
beliefs, preferences and actions of the agent as the theoretical starting point, and uses 
rational principles to try to weave these together into a coherent whole. The analog of 
microeconomic explanation as an equilibrium explanation of markets is rational choice 
theory as an equilibrium explanation of individual behavior (e.g,. Becker, 1976). Rational 
choice is the standard model of individual behavior in economics---and it is this equilibrium 
style of explanation that is under scrutiny in the literatures of judgments and decision 
making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), and behavioral economics (e.g., Camerer, 
Loewenstein & Rabin, 2011). 
 
Consider, for example, the notion of utility in modern economic theory. Rather than seeing 
utility as corresponding to some externally measurable good or objective (as in earlier 
economic ideas, Cooter & Rappoport, 1984), the modern notion of utility in economics 
serves simply to organize the preferences of an agent into a compact and coherent form. So, 
for example, a preference for coffee over tea, tea over milk, and coffee over milk can be 
captured by signing utilities of, say, 3, 2, and 1 to coffee, tea, and milk respectively, and 
proposing that the agent prefers drinks with a higher utility. Some rather mild constraints on 
the structure of preferences (e.g., most notably completeness and transitivity) will ensure 
that such a utility function can be defined.  
 
Note, crucially, that the very idea of utility is in no way concerned with performance 
according to some externally defined function; instead, it merely imposes internal 
coherence on an agent’s own preferences. There are good reasons to have preferences 
which have such coherence, and hence allow a utility scale to be defined. For example, if an 
agent’s preferences are intransitive (preferring, say, coffee to tea, tea to milk, and milk to 
coffee), and hence cannot be represented by utilities, then that agent can be turned into a so-
called “money pump.” Suppose that the agent starts with coffee. A devious counterparty 
can then offer to swap the coffee for milk, for a small fee; and then to swap milk for tea for 
a small fee, and finally to swap the tea back to coffee for a small fee. Now the agent is back 
where they started, but has paid fees to no purpose. Unless the agent changes one of the 
offending preferences, this can be repeated indefinitely, until the agent’s resources are 
exhausted  (although see Cubitt & Sugden, 2001). So even in the absence of any externally 
defined task, it seems that intransitive preferences must violate some form of rationality.  
 
If we broaden our agent’s domain to being able to trade uncertain options (e.g., tea if the 
teaspoon falls face down; coffee otherwise), then on some similarly mild conditions 
(completeness, transitivity, and some more technical assumptions about independence and 
continuity), the agent can be assigned utilities (about tea, coffee and so on) and 
probabilities (e.g., degrees of belief in the teaspoon falling face down), such that one 
uncertain option is preferred to another just when it has a higher expected utility, according 
to those utilities and probabilities. Then it turns out that if our agent makes any violation of 
probability theory, whether large or small (e.g., perhaps the agent commits the conjunction 
fallacy, Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), then the agent can also be money-pumped: 
specifically, the agent can be offered a set of gambles each of which the agent believes is 
fair, but which collectively guarantee that the agent will lose money (this is known as a 
“Dutch book”). Again, rationality is a matter of coherence within the agent: here, linking 
the agent’s degrees of belief, utilities, and actions (i.e., choosing one option or another). 
Note that it is this equilibrium notion of rationality that is at issue in the fields of judgment 
and decision making and behavioral economics, where the standard against which human 
behavior is judged is drawn from abstract theories of coherence: probability theory, 
decision theory, game theory and logic (e.g., Chater & Oaksford, 2012).  
  
The All-Seeing Eye in Rational Explanation 
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Felin et al put forward an argument concerning hidden assumptions underlying rational 
explanation in the context of vision; and then extrapolate to discussion of rationality in 
economic decision making. Yet we suggest that the style of explanation, and the role of 
rationality, is very different in each; and, crucially, that this blocks the extrapolation from 
one domain to the other. Felin et al’s concern is, in brief, that it is mistaken to suppose that 
the function of perception is “reconstruct” some objectively described “external world” 
from sensory data. They rightly point out that many aspects of perceptual experience (e.g., 
color, lightness, and, we would argue, most everyday common-sense categories for which 
there are verbal labels) no more correspond to the nature of the external world than, to 
borrow Hoffman’s (2009) powerful analogy, the colors, shapes and layouts of items on a 
computer desktop correspond to objective internal states of its silicon chip.  
 
Yet no such characterization of the external world is required to make sense of rational 
equilibrium explanation, which depends purely on the coherence of internal elements of the 
system. Note, for example, that the rational principles of finance theory impose coherence 
constraints on prices, but without requiring any particular relationship between prices and 
the external world. For example, it could be that the entire market is vastly overpriced if, for 
example, no market participants are aware of an imminent exogenous “shock”---such as a 
cataclysmic meteor strike. Of course, were astonomers to declare such a strike to be likely, 
stock market panic would ensue---the dis-equilibrium between stock valuations based on 
putative long-term revenue streams and the apparently short-term time-horizon of 
civilization would lead to a market collapse. But, tellingly, it is the beliefs of astonomers 
and investors that matter, not the actual state of the external world (so that the panic will be 
just as great, even if the meteor strike is actually a false alarm).  
 
Rational explanation in judgment and decision making works in the same way as in finance 
theory or microeconomics. The conjunction fallacy, for example, exposes an incoherence 
between degrees of belief (i.e., that a person believes A & B to be strictly more likely than 
A alone). But any external reality to which proposition A and B refer is irrelevant. The 
essence of mathematical theories of rationality, such as probability theory, decision theory, 
game theory, and mathematical logic, is that they describe incoherence between beliefs, 
preferences or actions which are purely structural in nature. Matters of internal coherence 
(or incoherence) are entirely independent of external reality. Hence, Felin et al’s concerns 
about the all-seeing-eye do not arise. 
 
The Scope and Limits of Functional Explanation 
 
Functional explanation, whether involving rationality or not, aims to understand the 
function of a system within some large system; and hence the theorist needs to be able to 
characterize the nature of that larger system. Here, Felin et al’s concerns have potential bite. 
Can the larger external system always be characterized? And can it be characterized 
independently from the system under study?  
 
We agree that these are deep issues. But they are not specific to rational functional 
explanation (e.g., ideal observer models, Bayes models of perception, Marr’s computational 
level of explanation, and so on), but arise for functional explanation of any form. Thus, 
viewing the heart as functioning as a pump requires outlining other elements of the 
circulatory system. And viewing a biological structure as an arteries or a veins (rather than 
a mere network of flexible tubes) may make no sense, except in the light of their 
connections to the heart. Similarly, the courtship behavior of a bird has the function of 
increasing the probability of mating; yet that behavior operates not via shaping some 
objective external reality, but via the interpretation of that behavior by a potential mate. 
More broadly, the behavior of a species may be well-adapted to functioning successfully in 
its niche; but that niche may not necessarily have an existence wholly independent of the 
species itself.  
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In practice, despite these deep issues, functional explanation in biology appears to be 
hugely valuable throughout the biological sciences: Seeing the heart as pump, or courtship 
behavior as driven by mate-finding, seems extremely productive, even essential. And 
viewing stereopsis or structure-from-motion as mechanisms that aim to recover the 3D 
layout of the world; or viewing memory as adapted to prioritizing information that is likely 
to be useful in the present situation seem no more (or less) problematic than conventional 
functional explanations, concerning, for example, the shape of the lens or the transparency 
of the cornea.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Felin et al raise important concerns with the application of rational explanation in the 
cognitive and social sciences. We argue that rationality plays a part in two very different 
styles of explanation: functional explanation (where Felin et al’s concerns potentially apply) 
and equilibrium explanation (where they do not). Even where Felin et al’s worries do apply, 
and theorists need to provide an external characterization of the “environment” or “task” for 
the perceptual or cognitive process under study, functional explanation is often feasible and 
valuable---indeed, we believe it raises no special difficulties over and above the wider 
challenge of making sense of functional explanation in the biological sciences and social 
sciences.  
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WHO ARE YOU GOING TO BELIEVE? A COMMENT 
 
David Funder 
 
 
Who are you going to believe: Me, or your lying eyes? 
--Anonymous 
 
If I may use an auditory metaphor on top of the visual one used so effectively by Felin et al, 
the term “multi-stable rationality” sounds disturbingly similar, in my ears, to the term 
“alternative facts” recently popularized in US political discourse. And just as taking the 
idea of alternative facts seriously will lead to ruin, so too, I fear, will the idea of multi-
stable rationality. 
I agree with the article in many respects, particularly its calling into question the unrealistic  
and even wrong standards of rationality that are often used as the basis for regarding human 
judgment as deeply flawed. I also think the article is profoundly correct to note how human 
judgment is typically evaluated not only against questionable criteria, but against a standard 
of perfection. It is telling that, in research from the errors-and-biases tradition, any 
deviation from the normative model employed is held up as evidence of flawed judgment.  
Even if the criteria for correct or rational judgment were always justified, which they are 
not, the news from the vast literature on judgmental error would still boil down to “people 
are not perfect.” And this is news? More useful, perhaps, might be to study how people get 
things right, when they do (Funder, 1995, 1999; see Felin et al, 2017: footnote 18 in the 
target article). 
Still, the target article goes too far in its criticism of the visual metaphor as a way to see 
reality. I did not find the most vivid example in the article to be compelling. When someone 
in a gorilla suit walks by a person counting basketball passes and is not noticed, that is an 
amusing demonstration of focused attention. As the authors note, it does not imply that 
people are blind, or stupid. But neither does it show that reality in this situation cannot be 
visually identified. Someone looking at the gorilla might miscount the passes; someone 
counting the passes might overlook the gorilla.  But a detached observer could, in principle, 
look at both, or at least could look at one and then the other, and get a more full view of 
reality. We don’t always, or perhaps ever, need to know about everything that is happening 
around us, fortunately. But it can be done; indeed, the paragraph in the article that points 
out the alternative views of the gorilla-blindness situation could not have been written if 
this were not so. 
I will grant that we see only a small part of the electro-magnetic spectrum, and that we 
evolved as a species to survive and reproduce, not to accurately represent reality. But these 
goals are surely compatible, and perhaps even mutually necessary; to some extent survival 
must require accurate apprehension of reality. Deep philosophy and quantum theory aside, I 
would suggest that the portion of the environment susceptible to human observation is, for 
human purposes, a sufficient definition of reality.  
Indeed, to conclude otherwise is to undermine the foundations of science itself, an 
enterprise that outside the academy is making disturbing progress these days. As many 
observers have noted, science is a sort of game that is designed to get us ever closer to the 
truth, while at the same time recognizing that we shall never quite get there. But if truth 
doesn’t exist, then getting closer to it has no meaning. 
Gordon Allport (1958) once noted how some psychologists wished to regard personality 
traits as hypothetical constructs that don’t exist in any real sense, but are merely thoughts in 
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the minds of observers. He acknowledged that this view has some merit, because traits 
cannot be directly seen (that visual metaphor again), but only implied from indirect 
indicators such as self-reports and behavioral observations. But then, Allport suggested an 
analogy with astronomy. Those little lights in the night sky, images in our lenses, and 
pulses detected by radio telescopes are at best extremely indirect indicators of the stars and 
galaxies that are presumably really out there. But if we took away that presumption of 
reality, and decided that stars and galaxies are no more than hypothetical constructs in the 
minds of astronomers, then astronomy would become the study of how astronomers think, 
rather than the study of the contents of the universe. Indeed, it might be interesting to study 
how astronomers think. But it would be sad to stop trying to learn about what’s really out 
there. By the same token, Allport pleaded for a psychology that tried to learn what it could 
about personality, not just people’s perceptions of it. 
I feel the same way about multi-stable rationality. I’m happy to argue about alternative 
definitions of reality, or of rationality, but I’d like the goal of the argument to be to decide 
which one is right, even if the goal is never achieved. In my own work, something I call the 
“situation construal model” identifies the individual construal of reality as a crucial 
determinant of his or her behavior (Funder, 2016). This construal is a joint function of the 
individual’s personality and cognitive traits (individual differences), and reality itself. The 
model puts alternative construals at the center of the analysis, but gives reality a critical role 
too.   
What is reality? This is the oldest, deepest and most unsolved question in philosophy. A 
common response to the question is to give up. Cultural anthropologists often eschew 
comparing cultures with each other because they acknowledge lacking the god’s-eye view 
that would allow them to unerringly do so. Deconstructionist literary critics maintain that 
texts have no inherent meanings, just an infinite number of equally valid constructions 
thereof. Shall the psychological study of human judgment fall into the same trap? For I 
believe it is a trap. Reality is hard to know; we can never be sure we know the truth. But to 
give up the attempt to seek truth is not a solution; it is surrender, one that strands us in a 
world where alternative facts rule. 
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VISUAL ILLUSIONS AND ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY 
 
Gerd Gigerenzer 
 
According to Helmholtz, visual illusions reveal the ingenuity of the visual system, namely 
its ability to make intelligent unconscious inferences from limited or ambiguous 
information. These illusions help unravel the remarkable feats our brain can accomplish. In 
striking contrast, behavioral economists and some psychologists have presented visual 
illusions to support their claim that the mind systematically lacks rationality. If the visual 
system continues to make consistent errors after millions of years of evolution, what can 
be expected from human judgment or business decisions? Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
argued that people make severe errors of judgment, later named cognitive illusions in 
analogy to visual illusions. Today, rare is the book in behavioral economics that does not 
refer to visual illusions in order to describe cognitive illusions, mistaking the ingenuity of 
the visual system for irrationality. For instance, in Phishing for Phools, Akerlof and Shiller 
(2015) tell us that “psychological phools” come in two types: “In one case, emotions 
override the dictates of his common sense. In the other case, cognitive biases, which are 
like optical illusions, lead him to misinterpret reality” (p. xi). Because visual illusions are 
persistent, so the argument goes, people’s cognitive illusions are equally stubborn, leaving 
little hope of any sustainable corrective. Out of this perspective, visual illusions became 
the justification for governmental paternalism, known as nudging (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008). 
 
How could vision be suddenly mistaken as the prototype of stubborn irrationality? Felin, 
Koenderink, and Krueger (in press) point to a specific assumption in this research, which 
they call the all-seeing eye. The assumption is that the researcher is gifted with 
omniscience and always able to see the correct state of the world or the correct answer to 
the text problem studied. In the Müller-Lyer illusion, the correct state is assumed to be the 
physical lengths of the lines: “The presence of an error of judgment is demonstrated by 
comparing people’s response either with an established fact (e.g., that the two lines are 
equal in length) or with an accepted rule of arithmetic, logic, or statistics” (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982, 123). Felin et al criticize this narrow understanding of what the “fact” or 
benchmark for a perceptual judgment is and, consequently, how such an assumption 
misses the very function of perception: to go beyond the information given on the retina 
(or in a drawing), that is, to infer the third dimension from a two-dimensional picture. To 
equate measured dimensions with statistical rules also claims a second assumption, namely 
researchers’ omniscience regarding the correct answer to problems that involve probability 
or statistics (the so-called “accepted” rule). I agree with Felin et al.'s critique of this fact-
minus-judgment analysis, which is a step backwards from both Helmholtz and present-day 
research on perception (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1991; 2005). However, they appear to think that 
the assumption of omniscience also underlies the study of ecological rationality (Todd, 
Gigerenzer & the ABC Research Group, 2012) when writing that ecological rationality 
assumes “that perception, over time, is in fact veridical rather than biased: organisms … 
learn its true, objective nature” (p. 2 in the manuscript). I am grateful for their making this 
misunderstanding explicit because it provides an opportunity to clarify what ecological 
rationality is: It means functionality, not veridicality. To address this misunderstanding, I 
will briefly discuss one concrete visual illusion.  
 
 
 
Seeing Is Inference 
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Consider Figure 1. On the left side are dots that appear concave, that is, recede into the 
surface like cavities. On the right side are also dots, but these appear convex, that is, pop 
out from the surface like eggs. Now turn the page upside down. The cavities will turn into 
eggs, and the eggs into cavities. This striking phenomenon is a key to understanding the 
workings of the human brain (Kleffner & Ramachandran, 1992).  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
The brain cannot know the outside world with certainty; it can only make intelligent 
inferences. In the present case, it faces an impossible task: to construct a three-dimensional 
object from its two-dimensional retinal image. How can this be achieved? To infer what is 
outside, the brain uses a chain of intelligent inferences, based on three assumptions about 
the world:  
 
Ecological Axiom 1: The world is 3-D. 
Ecological Axiom 2: Light comes from above.  
Ecological Axiom 3: There is only one source of light. 
 
I call these assumptions ecological axioms because, unlike the logical axioms of decision 
theory, these statements have content and are based on the ecological structure of the 
world. The three ecological axioms are characteristic for human and mammalian history. 
We can move in space south–north, west–east, and up–down, that is, in three dimensions 
(3-D), and for most of mammalian history, light came from a single source above, the sun 
or moon. Even today, we sit in rooms where the light predominantly comes from above, 
and we may get confused by a light coming at us horizontally, such as by the headlights of 
another vehicle while driving, or by multiple lights coming from different angles.  
 
These three axioms help us to infer the third dimension. Yet this inference is ecological 
rather than purely logical, using a heuristic, that is, a simple rule that exploits 
environmental structures. When light falls on a three-dimensional object, its rays cast 
shadows.  Our brains use this relationship to infer the third dimension from the position of 
the shading: 
 
Shade Heuristic: If the shade is in the upper part of the dots, then they recede into 
the surface; if the shade is in the lower part, the dots projects out from the surface. 
 
Now consider Figure 1 again. On the left side, where the upper part of the spheres is 
darker, we see the spheres as cavities. On the right side, where the lower part is darker, we 
see them popping out towards us. The position of the shading is sufficient for making the 
inference. Now let us have a closer look at the two concepts in the if-clause of the 
heuristic, shade and upper part. Our brain cannot know for certain that a dark area is a 
shadow and thus has to make another intelligent inference. Again it uses cues. The decisive 
cue appears to be the fuzziness of the border between the dark and light parts. Shadows are 
fuzzy. One can experimentally test this explanation by replacing the fuzzy contour with a 
clean-cut black-and-white contour. When the fuzziness is removed, our brain no longer 
interprets the black color as shade, meaning that the if-clause of the shade heuristic is no 
longer valid (Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 2008). In the same way one can 
investigate how the brain infers what “upper part” means. Is “up” relative to the ground 
(gravity) or relative to the position of one’s head? Experiments show that the brain infers 
“above” from the position of the head, that is, using its vestibular system rather than 
gravity. Signals from the body’s center of balance—the vestibular system—, guided by the 
positions of little stones in the ears called otoliths, travel to the visual centers to correct the 
mental picture of the world (so that the world continues to look upright). 
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To summarize, seeing a dot as concave or convex appears to be based on three ecological 
axioms and the shade heuristic, which in turn is based on a cascade of inferences that 
estimate the concepts in the if-clause of the heuristic. These inferences invoke the 
vestibular system (to infer where above is) and contour detection systems (to infer that 
there is a shadow). The example also illustrates how heuristics feed on evolved core 
capacities of our brain.  
 
Ecological Rationality 
 
So far, I introduced three concepts for understanding of perceptual inferences: uncertainty, 
ecological axioms, and heuristic inference. The final concept is:  
 
Ecological Rationality: A heuristic is ecologically rational to the degree it is adapted to the 
environment, that is, to the conditions specified in the ecological axioms. 
 
The term environment, as defined by the ecological axioms, does not relate to a world 
independent of humans, as Felin et al appear to assume, but to the world as experienced by 
humans, as in Uexküll’s (1957) Umwelt. For instance, the axiom that the world is 3-D is 
not a statement about the true structure of space, but a statement about the fact that humans 
experience a three-dimensional world in the sense that we can move right–left, forwards–
backwards, and up–down. In Figure 1, the 3-D axiom is violated because this world has 
been replaced by a two-dimensional drawing. In this specific setting, using the shade 
heuristic is not ecologically rational, while in a three-dimensional world, it is. The 
resulting discrepancy is often called a visual illusion. Yet it is the result of an intelligent 
inference under uncertainty that should not be confused with irrationality.  
 
Uncertainty Is Inescapable 
 
Uncertainty about the world in which we live is not restricted to the third dimension in 
space, as in the example above. It is universal because our sensory systems provide a 
limited basis to construct the world, in several respects: (1) Limited senses. For instance, 
humans cannot sense electrical and magnetic fields or radioactivity, nor can they detect 
water pressure. And we may lack all those senses we are unaware of, such as that indicated 
by animals' “knowing” an earthquake is coming before we can notice anything. (2) Limited 
range within a sense. Our senses have absolute upper and lower thresholds, beyond which 
we do not notice anything.  (3) Limited discriminability within a range. Our senses have 
differential thresholds, which are defined as the just noticeable difference. (4) Limited 
samples of experience, due to our finite attention and lifespan. Small samples can be 
exploited by simple heuristics, which is another reason why the brain often works with 
heuristics rather than fine-tuned complex algorithms (Gigerenzer, 2016). These heuristics 
are functional, not veridical, and no omniscient researcher is needed to study the ingenuity 
of visual intelligence.  
 
All these are characteristics that define the “twilight of uncertainty,” which contrasts with 
the assumption of an all-seeing eye. Felin et al have reminded psychologists that there are 
two kinds of research questions one can pose. The first is about uncertainty: How does the 
brain construct its world in order to be able to function, replicate, and survive? The second 
is about certainty: Do people’s judgments deviate from what I, the researcher, believe to be 
the correct, and only correct answer? Asking the first question has brought deep insights 
into the workings of the mind–environment system. Asking the second question has 
resulted in a list of 175 cognitive biases that can be found on Wikipedia, with little 
understanding of their precise mechanism and function. To find the right answer to the 
wrong question is known as a Type-III error. There are still too many of these in our 
journals. 
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Figure 1: Visual Illusions illustrate unconscious inferences on the basis of 
assumptions about the environment. The dots on the left side appear to be curved 
inward (concave), those on the right side curved outward (convex). If you turn the 
page around, then the concave dots will pop out and vice versa (based on Kleffner & 
Ramachandran, 1992). 
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BIOLOGICAL RELATIVISM AND DIRECTED PERCEPTION 
Denis Noble 
 
Felin, Koenderink & Krueger’s article is a highly welcome counter to a persistent, but incorrect, 
twentieth century development in the science of perception. This is the idea that to analyse 
perception we need to understand simply that there is a mismatch between how science 
objectively describes the world and how humans (and other organisms) perceive it. We then 
explain visual and other illusions by comparing them with objective measurements such as 
wavelengths of light or other radiation.  
 
By contrast, Felin et al challenge the idea that any fully “objective measurement of color or 
luminance” is possible since “it is not as easy (if not impossible) to disentangle illusion, 
perception, and reality.” They then show how the metaphors derived from the physiology of 
perception have influenced our understanding of rationality, and rational agency in particular, as 
used in economics and other areas of social science. Their position resembles in part von 
Uexküll’s and Tinbergen’s ideas that each organism has its own unique way of viewing the 
world, for identifying objects and their utilities, and associated perceptions and behaviors. As 
Felin et al note, “perception therefore depends more on the nature of the organism than on the 
nature of the environment”. And, the “fundamental issue is the directedness of perception due to 
a priori factors associated with the organism itself.” I would particularly like to emphasize their 
point about the “directedness” of perception, to anticipate my conclusion. 
 
One of the reasons I support Felin et al’s conclusions is because their argument has a lot in 
common with a major argument currently occurring in biological science. This is on the nature of 
biological causation. The strong form is represented by the view that there is an objective 
description of what organisms perceive, and thus organisms are essentially passive agents in the 
world. Causation runs in one direction: upwards from molecules to man. This view can be traced 
back at least to Descartes in 1664: 
 
“If one had a proper knowledge of all the parts of the semen of some species of animal in 
particular, for example of man, one might be able to deduce the whole form and 
configuration of each of its members from this alone, by means of entirely mathematical 
and certain arguments, the complete figure and the conformation of its members.” (de la 
formation du fœtus, para LXVI p 146) 
 
We can trace this kind of argument all the way from Descartes’ text through Laplace (A 
Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, 1840), Schrödinger (What is Life? 1943), to the Central 
Dogma of Molecular Biology (Crick 1958, 1970) – a historical sequence that I have analysed and 
countered in a recent book (Noble, 2016, chapter 6).  
 
Modern neurophysiology has revealed the many respects in which there is causation running 
centrifugally from the central nervous system to modulate input from the sense organs. But there 
is still a presumption that, behind all this modulation and interpretation, the result is still a 
representation of reality. In principle it could be made to conform to the assumed objective 
reality of physical measurements, once we allow for the mechanisms that create the illusions. The 
one (perception) is simply a transform of the other (reality). Reality can then in turn be seen as a 
transform of what we perceive. We just need to know the transform function and we can then 
know the reality.  
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The more fundamental question is whether there is an objective reality waiting to be perceived. 
This is no longer as obvious as was once assumed. At the least, modern physics warns us that 
“reality is not what it seems”, to quote the title of Carlo Rovelli’s (2016) magnificent book.  
 
So, how did we come to think otherwise? In the 19th century, both physics and biology assumed 
there was a clear objective reality; indeed it was thought to be so obvious as not to need stating.  
At the beginning of the 20th century physics peeled away from that view. Relativity and quantum 
mechanics taught us that we were not at all sure what reality we might be talking about. 20th 
century biology however largely ignored these developments in physics. Quantum mechanics was 
thought to concern only the microphysical level, while relativity concerns only the cosmic scale.  
 
I take a more radical view, which is that it was unfortunate that the revolution in physics passed 
by with little or no impact on biological science. My first reason is that the revolution that led to 
quantum mechanics destroyed the assumption that the bottom level in scientific explanation of 
phenomena is a rock solid atomism. Molecules, such as genes and proteins, may not be the 
ultimate bottom level, but they could be assumed to rest on lower levels that were seen as 
determinate, or hard, an assumption that was needed for the reductionist agenda to be successful. 
We now know that this is simply not the case. As we descend the levels below atoms and 
molecules, we encounter stochasticity, not certainty, in the behaviour of the universe.  
 
My second reason is that biology needs to follow physics in respecting the general principle of 
relativity. Here I need to explain what the general principle of relativity is. Relativity is usually 
identified today with the two theories of Einstein: the special and the general theories of 
relativity. These are indeed examples of the general principle of relativity, which is the strategy to 
distance ourselves from any metaphysical standpoint for which there is insufficient justification. 
Thus, the special theory of relativity can be seen as distancing us from the assumption of a 
privileged spatio-temporal frame of reference, from which it becomes clear that there is no 
absolute measure of movement. The general theory of relativity can be seen as distancing 
ourselves from the assumption that space-time and gravity are distinct. These paradigm shifts can 
also be seen to rest on previous applications of the general principle of relativity, which first 
moved us away from regarding the earth as the centre of the universe, then from the idea that the 
sun might be, finally to the idea that there is no centre—and no edge either.  
 
The unjustified metaphysical idea in biology is that there is a privileged level of causation, which 
was assumed almost without question to be the molecular level. This metaphysical position, for 
that is what it is, led in turn to the modern strongly gene-centric view of biology. On this view, 
agency in biology ultimately derives from genes, which are the object of natural selection. In its 
more extreme forms this view actually removes agency from organisms. They become Cartesian 
automata. This is the view taken by many gene-centric biologists as a natural interpretation of, for 
example, the experiments of Libet et al (1983) on the neural basis of a decision (Noble, 2016: 
247-267). 
 
It was, in part, the absurdity of this view of agency in organisms that led me to formulate the 
principle of biological relativity. This states that, a priori, there is no privileged level of causation 
in biology. Like other theories of relativity, the principle of biological relativity is a deeply 
mathematical concept. Another way to state the principle is that the equations of any model we 
may construct to describe biological systems depend on the initial and boundary conditions for 
any solution of the equations to be possible. The initial conditions are a function of the history of 
the organism, while the boundary conditions are a function of the environment and its interaction 
with the organism.  
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This principle leads to a view of agency in organisms that is, I believe, strongly compatible with 
the view propounded by Felin et al. Organisms are then viewed as agents creating their 
environment, and as agents in the directedness of their own evolution.  
 
That is why I strongly agree with Felin et al that the “fundamental issue is the directedness of 
perception due to a priori factors associated with the organism itself.” 
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ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY NEEDS NO ALL-SEEING EYE 
Samuel Nordli, Peter M. Todd, Gerd Gigerenzer 
Rationality has been envisioned in multiple ways. Traditional unbounded views of rationality 
derive optimal decisions by assuming unlimited knowledge and unlimited cognitive power to 
process that knowledge; constrained optimization views of rationality add some cognitive 
limitations but still assume a psychologically implausible process that aims for the best possible 
decisions under those constraints. Visions of bounded rationality focus on plausible heuristics that 
people and other animals may use. In the heuristics-and-biases approach (Kahneman, Slovic, & 
Tversky, 1982), such heuristic decision making is seen as often leading to biases and deviations 
from optimal behavior; in contrast, the ecological rationality framework analyzes which 
structures of environments enable heuristics to achieve adaptive goals. Felin, Koenderink, and 
Krueger make the interesting observation that most of these visions of rationality imply a capacity 
for unlimited perception—the all-seeing eye—which permits the identification of optimal 
decisions with its single veridical assessment of the entire state of the world. However, contrary 
to what Felin et al at times suggest, this applies to neither the vision of ecological rationality nor 
Herbert Simon's vision of bounded rationality. In this commentary we address how Felin et al 
appear to conflate the bounded rationality championed by Simon with that of Kahneman, 
Tversky, and others; we go on to show how this leads Felin et al to mischaracterize the Simon-
inspired framework of ecological rationality. We then explain how the vision of ecological 
rationality provides a natural cognitive complement to the ideas of limited, specific perception 
that Felin et al champion; finally, we highlight how limited perception can be a cognitive 
advantage and why the empirical investigation of general cognitive capacities is not as fruitless or 
futile as Felin et al make it out to be.  
Simon’s bounded rationality is not Kahneman’s bounded rationality; Ecological rationality 
is not optimization 
It is important to distinguish two types of research questions when studying rationality and 
decision making. The first asks how people make decisions in situations of uncertainty—i.e., 
when the future is uncertain and one cannot know the best answer ahead (see Todd, Gigerenzer, 
& the ABC Research Group, 2012); under uncertainty, by definition, omniscience is a fiction and 
optimal strategies cannot be calculated. The second type assumes a situation of calculable risk, 
removing all uncertainty (Knight 1921) and allowing for the convenient mathematics of 
optimization. In psychology, optimization models have been used to argue in favor of human 
rationality, as in Bayesian models of cognition, but also to argue for our lack of rationality, as in 
the heuristics-and-biases program. Felin et al charge that optimization models unjustifiably 
assume a veridical assessment of the entire state of a given situation, as that assumption requires 
the impossible all-seeing eye. We agree that this is a major and problematic assumption in the 
heuristics-and-biases program of Kahneman, Tversky, and others. For virtually every problem 
posed to subjects, these researchers presume to know the correct answer a priori, although this 
self-declared omniscience has not stood up to critical tests (e.g., Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999; 
Gigerenzer, Fiedler, & Olsson, 2012). When responses deviate from these omniscient projections, 
such 'errors' are typically attributed to cognitive illusions. Felin et al’s critique of many 
psychologists’ overconfidence in their normative convictions is timely: researchers must 
distinguish between situations of risk, in which the best answer can be calculated, and those of 
uncertainty, wherein optimization is impossible—except in hindsight.  
Yet Felin et al appear to have been misled by a wider literature that misrepresents Simon as a 
genuine precursor of the heuristics-and-biases approach. The latter approach accepts the classical 
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norms of economic theory as rational, claiming irrationality where human judgments deviate; in 
contrast, Simon argued that the study of bounded rationality should deal with situations of 
uncertainty where “the conditions for rationality postulated by the model of neoclassical 
economics are not met” (Simon, 1989, p. 377). Simon advocated acknowledging the limits of 
optimization; for him, the use of heuristics is not a deviation from what is optimal, but rather an 
example of how people satisfice when they cannot optimize. Felin et al are mistaken when they 
equate Simon's call for studying behavior under uncertainty with the assumed omniscience in the 
heuristics-and-biases program—the all-seeing eye as depicted by Felin et al does not feature in 
the program of bounded rationality as promoted by Simon. As a direct consequence of this 
confusion, the guilt of presumed omniscience is similarly misattributed to those operating within 
the framework of ecological rationality (Todd, Gigerenzer, & the ABC Research Group, 2012). 
Directly building on Simon’s program of bounded rationality, this framework studies both (1) the 
heuristics people use when optimal answers are indeterminable, and (2) the ecological conditions 
in which a given heuristic can be expected to outperform competing strategies (even those using 
relatively more information). 
The overall perspective of ecological rationality is that adaptive decision-making can emerge 
from the fit between the structures of appropriate information-processing mechanisms in the mind 
and the structures of information in the world. These mental mechanisms are often simple 
heuristics that exploit the available structure of environments, using relatively little information to 
reach good-enough (not optimal) solutions to the challenges facing the organism (Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2007). One of the implications of this foundation is that perception need not be 
veridical—it only needs to be effective for the adaptive problems at hand, just like the decision-
making process overall: “for cognition to be successful, there is no need for a perfect mental 
image of the environment—just as a useful mental model is not a veridical copy of the world, but 
provides key abstractions while ignoring the rest” (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012, p. 15). Perceptual 
illusions then can show which environmental structures are important and useful to (and hence 
assumed by) the particular cognitive system. For instance, in the concave/convex dots illusion 
(Gigerenzer, 2005), two-dimensional dots with shading underneath are judged to be convex 
(sticking out from the plane) because the system assumes and expects the reliable environmental 
structure of a single source of light from above causing the shading. 
Ecological Rationality Implies Species-Specific Cognition 
A direct implication of the ecological rationality framework is that cognition (including 
perception) will be species-specific, with sensory systems viewed as functional products of 
natural selection that fit each species’ behavioral needs to their environments—providing a 
unique interface, as Felin et al say, between the two. Species-specific heuristics are necessary 
because different species operate within diverse ecological niches and use a range of core 
cognitive capacities. For instance, the ant Leptothorax albipennis has no direct way to measure 
the size of a candidate nest site, but this ant lays a fixed-length pheromone trail and—on a second 
fixed-length pass through the site—uses trail intersection rate as a heuristic estimate of its size 
(Hutchinson & Gigerenzer 2005). Or consider oscars (Astronotus ocellatus, a territorial species of 
cichlid fish), which use visual cues to modulate aggression toward intruders based on relative 
body size, exhibiting peak aggression towards dummies that are ~25% smaller than themselves 
(Beeching 1992). Finally, individual differences extend similarly to judgments based on 
perception: recognition is a key cue used in a variety of simple heuristics (e.g., take-the-best and 
the recognition heuristic; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999) that can be 
perceived only in relation to the individual’s own past experience, as experience determines what 
a given individual recognizes. While Felin et al call for future work to account for subjective 
Umweltian perceptual specificity, this fits closely with extant research in ecological rationality 
that explicitly concerns “the subjective ecology of the organism that emerges through the 
interaction of its mind, body, and sensory organs with its physical environment (similar to von 
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Uexküll’s…notion of Umwelt)” (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012, p. 18).  
Despite this study of organism- and species-level differences in perception and cognition, 
ecological rationality also proposes cross-species commonalities that allow us to understand some 
of the thinking of one species through analogies to the thinking of another. Felin et al suggest that 
this implies a closeted faith in both the all-seeing eye and the 'objective' nature that it perceives. 
But even if there were no such thing as veridical perception—no direct access to the 'true' nature 
of reality—the subjective nature of perception is not grounds for dismissing basic assumptions of 
objective physical materialism. Physicist Stephen Hawking suggests that “it makes no sense to 
ask if [a theory] corresponds to reality, because we do not know what reality is independent of a 
theory” (1993, p. 44). There is nothing 'truly' orange about electromagnetic radiation with 
wavelengths around 600 nm, and there is nothing 'truly' tart about citric acid—tangerines do not 
‘look’ or ‘taste’ like anything at all—but we do not have a successful model of reality that omits 
physics and chemistry, so it serves no purpose to suggest that an object, which (to us) looks and 
tastes like a tangerine, does not have approximately measurable relative properties such as mass, 
position, temperature, variable reflection and absorption of electromagnetic radiation, a quantity 
of sugar molecules, and so on (cf. Hickok, 2015, and other articles from that issue for further 
debate). Ultimately, the 'true' nature of reality is irrelevant; as long as something is real, and that 
something (whatever it is) is tied to evolutionary fitness, natural selection (blind watchmaker 
though it may be) can play the role of all-seeing eye, building individual organisms with adaptive 
responses to the environment based on all the situations that it—not any individual—has seen. 
After criticizing approaches that “only make sense by arguing that there is a true, actual nature to 
environments” (p. 5), Felin et al appear to proscribe basic, testable hypotheses about potential 
structural commonalities across organism-environment systems because such hypotheses are “not 
true to nature” (p. 6); and yet—truly—natural selection binds all life on Earth to fitness 
constraints. Although Felin et al rightly stress the “organism-specific factors that direct 
perception and attention” (p. 12), they are relatively silent regarding the often organism-general 
selection pressures and fitness opportunities toward which perception and attention are typically 
directed (e.g., collecting energy from the environment, evading predators, finding a mate, etc.). 
Consistent with this omission, Felin et al charge that “[it is not possible] to identify general 
factors related to objects, or environmental salience or objectivity across species, …as what is 
perceived is determined by the nature of the organism itself” (p. 12). This a priori assessment is 
unreasonably prohibitive. Ecological rationality proposes an adaptive toolbox of specialized tools 
that can be used effectively in a predictable variety of settings that share common features. The 
toolbox approach provides a metaphorical staging point for a particular type of hypothesis: in 
cases where likely overlap exists across certain species with regard to both a given goal (e.g., 
collecting energy) and the structure of the ecological contexts in which that goal is respectively 
pursued (e.g, patches of carbohydrates in the environment and the eukaryotic capacity to 
metabolize them), whether and how those species might also overlap in their pursuit of that goal 
is an empirical question and not to be dismissed out of hand.  
As an example showing a fruitful application of the adaptive toolbox approach, consider search 
(Hills, Todd, & Goldstone, 2008). For virtually all animals that must move about through space in 
search of sustenance—from humans down to simple worms—dopaminergic neurons fire when 
those animals encounter salient and rewarding environmental stimuli (such as species-specific 
food rewards; Barron, Søvik, & Cornish, 2010). Note that these neurons are not triggered by 
unrealistically universal perceptual input, but by species- and organism-specific sensory cues 
(e.g., habitual learning of stimuli that predict reward for that species/individual; Graybiel, 2008). 
While optimal foraging theory does assume a hypothetical 'all-seeing' eye, it is the blind eye of 
natural selection. Neither researcher nor foraging agent knows what a 'truly' optimal strategy 
looks like, but human researchers have the unique knowledge that every living forager on Earth 
has been shaped by natural selection and is likely equipped with a perception-general fitness 
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detector that signals the presence of species-specific motivators in the environment. An estimate 
of how an organism could theoretically behave in order to maximize its intake while foraging (by 
deciding when to leave a patch and find another one) is simply a tool for researchers—a 
hypothesis used to predict how natural selection could have shaped an organism's behavioral and 
perceptual apparatus to fit a given environmental structure. 
Ecological rationality is thus a perspective that is both akin to but also more detailed than the 
view of 'user-centric' perception that Felin et al argue for. But even more so, ecological rationality 
provides a strong theoretical reason to expect that perception will be limited and specific, rather 
than all-seeing: simple heuristics work well exactly because they work with limited information. 
As Felin et al state, “the fact that many aspects of reality are hidden is useful rather than a 
computational problem or lack of objectivity on the part of the organism or observer” (p. 11). The 
reason for this is that limited perceptual input helps avoid the problem of overfitting noisy or 
unimportant data, allowing simple heuristics to remain useful and robust over time. Simple 
heuristics reduce error from overfitting by having a bias, which can be formally treated as the 
bias-variance tradeoff (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). In fact, “a ‘veridical’ system would 
overwhelm the mind with a vast amount of irrelevant details” (Gigerenzer, 2005, p. 5). 
To summarize, Felin et al have put a critical feature of theorizing on the spot: the assumption of 
an omniscient perceiver who knows exactly what is best and can determine the optimal behavior 
in every problem studied. While that may be the case in very simple tasks, such as in well-defined 
games, optimization is impossible in situations of uncertainty. Yet Felin et al miss the point that 
Simon’s program of bounded rationality addresses such situations wherein what is optimal is 
indeterminable by definition. Just as there are many visions of cognition, there are also many 
visions of the relationship between the mind and its environment, and many of them are similarly 
undermined by their visual underpinnings. Shepard's mirror notion of the mind (with minds 
'reflecting' structures in the environment) and Brunswik's mind lens model (with minds 
'refracting' perceived cues into internal judgments) typify such visual metaphors in which the fit 
between minds and environments relies upon veridical, universal perception (Todd & Gigerenzer, 
2001). Ecological rationality draws instead on Herbert Simon’s non-visual metaphor of the mind 
fitting to the environment like a pair of scissors. This image emphasizes how the two blades fit to 
each other—complementarily, not as exact mirror images—to work together and get the job done. 
This requires perception to provide information about the task-relevant aspects of an organism's 
environment—not veridical, universal, and all-seeing, but useful, specific to the perceiver, and 
seeing just enough. 
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PERCEPTUAL ILLUSION, JUDGMENTAL BIAS, AND THE LIMITS OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
 
Barry Schwartz 
 
 
Felin, Koenderink, and Krueger (2017) offer a three-part argument about research on heuristics, 
biases, and other violations of “rationality.” The first part is to show how much the work of 
Herbert Simon, Daniel Kahneman, and Amos Tversky on judgment and decision making has 
been modeled on accounts of visual perception. The second part is that these accounts of visual 
perception are based in an assumption of “inverse optics,” in which the environment teaches the 
visual system how to see the world as it is. The final part is that this model of visual perception—
of the “all-seeing eye”—is mistaken, that there is no one way that the visual world is. As Felin et 
al (2017) put it, “the standard paradigm uses a world-to-mind, rather than a mind-to-world, model 
of perception that is, quite simply, not true to the nature of perception (Felin et al., 2017, p. XX).” 
The implication of their argument is that research on heuristics and biases is similarly mistaken in 
its emphasis on error—on deviation from canonical principles of rational judgment and choice. In 
this comment I will attempt to elaborate on some of the authors’ points, and also to speculate on 
why theories of both visual perception and judgment and decision-making seem tied to normative 
models of seeing the world as it is (perception and judgment) and choosing in a way that is 
consistent with the theory of rational choice. 
 
Kahneman (2003, 2011) is quite explicit in taking the study of visual perception as a model of 
judgment and choice. The all-important concept of “framing” (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) is almost explicitly modeled on visual perception, and reference-
dependent choice is modeled on visual contrast effects, as is the heuristic of anchoring and 
adjustment. And the acronym introduced in his best-selling book (Kahneman, 2011)—WYSIATI 
(“what you see is all there is”) could not be more direct in its relation to visual perception. What 
seems to bother Felin et al (2017) is not the relation between judgment and decision on the one 
hand, and visual perception on the other, but the fact that research on human judgment has 
focused on “error” or “bias.” And what bothers them about this focus is the use of the term 
“error.” Whether a judgment is an error often depends on its deviation from the norms of rational 
choice theory, and Felin et al (2017) have a problem accepting these norms. Felin et al (2017) 
make similar arguments about the use of the word “illusion” in research on visual perception. The 
term “illusion” is parasitic on the “all-seeing eye” in the same way that “error” or “bias” is 
parasitic on the theory of rational choice. And both normative standards are highly problematic. 
Felin at al. (2017) have no issue with researchers studying illusions to learn how the visual 
system works, as long as people do not take the word “illusion” too literally. And they feel the 
same way about “bias” or “error” in judgment.   
 
In my reading, Kahneman and Tversky are less guilty of relying on the rational choice norm than 
perhaps students of visual perception are of relying on the all-seeing eye. Kahneman and Tversky 
repeatedly stressed that it was misleading to focus too much on “error” in studying heuristics and 
biases, a point made repeatedly by Gigerenzer and colleagues over the years (eg., Gigerenzer & 
Todd, 1999; Gold & Gigerenzer, 2002; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012). Because many of these biases 
were surprising, they attracted attention, but what was really interesting about them was not that 
they were mistakes, but that they taught us something important about how the system of 
judgment and decision-making worked. Indeed, in presenting his WYSIATI heuristic 
(Kahneman, 2011), Kahneman explicitly departs from the “all-seeing eye,” since he does not 
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mean by WYSIATI that what people apprehend is literally all there is, but that what people 
apprehend is all that will affect their judgment and decision. 
 
I find myself in essentially complete agreement with Felin et al (2017). Their arguments about 
how visual perception works harken back to the “new look” in perception that came to 
prominence more than half a century ago (e.g., Bruner & Goodman, 1947; Bruner & Postman, 
1947). Just as Felin et al (2017) do, proponents of the new look very much focused on the whole 
organism—social and cultural background, aspirations, expectations, motives—as a key 
contributor to perceptual judgment. In the early days of cognitive psychology, Neisser’s (1967) 
landmark book similarly called our attention to “analysis by synthesis” models of cognitive 
processes, according to which the organism (person) played an active role in perception by taking 
fragments of sensory data and using them to “construct” the percept, just as a paleontologist 
“analyzes” a collection of dinosaur bones by constructing the whole skeleton. According to new 
look theorists, perception can be very much a “top-down” affair, involving active participation of 
the perceiver rather than passive, bottom-up registration and computation of sensory information 
to match physical reality. 
 
My own work has not been about visual perception, but I have certainly questioned the normative 
status of rational choice theory (e.g., Keys & Schwartz, 2007; Schwartz, 1986, 2015). The paper 
with Keys (2007) introduced what we called “leaky rationality.” The thrust of our argument was 
that the context of choice can “leak” into one’s experience with the result of that choice, often 
validating in experience what seem to be judgment and choice errors. This idea was stated quite 
explicitly by Kahneman and Tversky themselves, when they said “In [some] cases, the framing of 
decisions affects not only decision but experience as well…  In such cases, the evaluation of 
outcomes in the context of decisions not only anticipates experience but also molds it” 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, p. 48). 
 
To take just one example, we are told by rational choice theory that the “sunk cost fallacy” is 
indeed a fallacy—an error. If one has bought a movie ticket, but finds after thirty minutes that the 
movie is terrible, one should leave. The “rational” calculation is of the utility of sitting through 
the bad movie in comparison to the utility of doing almost anything else. The cost of the ticket is 
“sunk,” so why waste another hour of ones life seeing the movie to the bitter end, just to get ones 
money’s worth. The answer, we proposed, is that for some (many) people, if they walk out of the 
movie, they will have to live with the regret of having wasted money, an emotion they can avoid 
by sitting through the movie until the end. For a person like this, is the sunk cost fallacy still a 
fallacy?  If the aim of a decision is to enhance utility—a subjective quantity—it is hard to know 
from what stance to criticize someone who quite reasonably acts so as to avoid regret, and thus to 
enhance utility. In an underappreciated study, Frisch (1993) gave participants problems of the sort 
that typically elicited “errors” in Kahneman and Tversky’s research. The problems involved 
asking participants questions of identical underlying structure but different surface form. The 
typical Kahneman and Tversky finding was that people were unable to see through surface form 
to underlying structure, so that they routinely gave different answers to what were, in some sense, 
two versions of the same questions.  Frisch then confronted people with the two versions of the 
problems on which they had given different answers and asked whether, examining them side by 
side, the people still thought the problems were different. In virtually every case, the majority of 
people who had given different answers to formally identical but superficially different versions 
of a given problem insisted that they were not two versions of the same thing.   
 
So, in line with Felin et al (2017), it seems sensible to me to view visual illusions and judgmental 
biases as data, not errors. And Felin et al (2017) could have gone further. Sometimes, distorted 
perceptions of the visual world are actually quite beneficial. Lateral inhibition enhances 
boundaries between objects. Sensory adaptation makes it easier to detect novelty. Attention, 
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which suppresses much of what is going on in the visual field, enables us to process what we are 
attending to in greater depth and detail. Lateral inhibition, adaptation, and attention are all 
distortions. But we could not get through a day without them. 
 
Similarly, in the domain of judgment and decision, people seem to fail to appreciate that money is 
fungible, and divide expenditures and receipts into different mental accounts. They pay 14% 
interest on credit card balances while still putting $25/week into a savings account that earns 1%. 
The money that goes into the bank is in a different “mental account” (perhaps a “vacation,” 
“retirement, “ or “childrens’ college” account) than the money they use to pay off credit-card 
debt. In a simple, laboratory setting, such examples of mental accounting seem foolish. But in the 
complexity of the natural world, dividing income and outflow into accounts may be the only way 
to make sense of anything. How long would it take to decide what to do with a $1,000 graduation 
gift if one put everything one could possibly do with $1,000 on the table as a possibility? Thus, as 
Thaler (1999) pointed out, not only does mental accounting matter, but it actually helps us 
organize almost unimaginable complexity into manageable chunks. People keep mental accounts, 
and there is no plausible normative theory of how they should keep mental accounts. Indeed, it 
seems clear to me that the rational choice norm in judgment and decision-making is far more 
dubious than the all-seeing eye norm in visual perception. One can imagine using physical 
measuring instruments to determine what is “really” out there as a benchmark against which to 
compare what people see. In contrast, rational choice theory is a norm for making decisions that 
serve “utility,” or “preference,” not wealth. But utility is a fundamentally subjective concept. 
Utility is person dependent. As Stigler and Becker (1947) famously said, “de gustibus non est 
disputandum” (there is no accounting for taste). 
 
In the face of so much evidence that the “all-seeing eye” is not a useful normative model of visual 
perception and the “rational economic agent” is not a useful normative model of judgment and 
decision, it is worth asking why researchers cling so tenaciously to these models. I propose that 
the answer may lie in an argument made by Fodor (1983). Thirty-five years ago, Fodor (1983) 
published a highly influential and controversial book, The Modularity of Mind (and see Schwartz 
& Schwartz, 1984, for a detailed discussion).  In the book, Fodor divided the mind into three 
sectors: sensory processors, the “central system,” and what he called “input modules.” The job of 
the input modules was to take the outputs from sensory processors and turn them into a form that 
could be utilized by the central system. 
 
Fodor made a variety of bold claims about the nature of input modules and about modularity 
more generally. They generated a great deal of research aimed at identifying modules and 
characterizing what kinds of information they could exploit and what kinds were opaque to them. 
Much less attention was devoted to Fodor’s characterization of central systems, but as bold as 
Fodor’s claims were about modules, his claims about central systems were even bolder. The 
central system is what we normally have in mind when we talk about deliberation, reason, and 
thinking. It is the part of the cognitive apparatus that we are using when we are consciously and 
deliberately trying to make sense of something. According to Fodor, the key difference between 
central systems and modules is that whereas modules are “informationally encapsulated” (they 
can only respond to certain types of information, even when other information might be relevant 
to their information processing tasks), central systems are not informationally encapsulated.  
Anything might be relevant to the interpretive problem at hand, and thus the central system is 
wide open to all kinds of influences. But the problem, according to Fodor, is that for just this 
reason, we cannot have a science of central systems. Because context always matters, and 
because every context is in some ways unique, there are no lawful generalizations about central 
systems to be had, except, perhaps, for generalizations so abstract that they yield little in the way 
of predictions in specific situations.   
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According to Fodor, for a science to make progress, practitioners must be able to “carve nature at 
its joints,” that is, scientists must be able to divide their domain of study into meaningful, well-
behaved chunks. Modules do this. But the central system, Fodor argues, has no joints. The 
example Fodor uses to make his case is the development of science itself. Scientific activity is 
paradigmatically central-system activity. But, Fodor observes, despite centuries of effort, we have 
no science of science. Indeed, he suggests, we can have no science of science. This is partly 
because when it comes to a scientific understanding of a domain, anything might be relevant (a 
characteristic he calls “isotropic”). And it is partly because, as we have known since Quine (1951; 
with a significant contribution by Kuhn, 1962), the notion that we can use pristine data to test 
theories is naïve. Theories tell us what counts as data, a characteristic of the scientific enterprise 
that Fodor refers to as “Quinean.” 
 
The argument is not that scientific advance is random or capricious (though sometimes it might 
be). It is that scientific advance can be understood with historical analysis, and not with 
ahistorical, law-like generalizations. Historians help us make sense of the past whether or not 
their accounts enable us to predict the future. So, according to Fodor, while it might be possible to 
develop a history of central systems, just as we have a history of science, we can’t expect to 
develop a science of central systems. 
 
In my view, a substantial appeal of the “all-seeing eye” and “inverse optics” in visual perception, 
and the rational choice model in decision-making, is that “objective” stances like these enable us 
to develop a science. If Felin et al (2017) are correct that these approaches ignore the key role of 
the organism, in both perception and in judgment and decision-making, then we are entering the 
domain of what Fodor called central systems. Anything might be relevant to a perceptual 
judgment, a valuation, a probability estimate, or a choice. Past experience, current context, 
attentional focus, judgmental anchors, individual motives and desires each might play a role in 
what people see, what they want, and what they choose. Felin et al (2017) speak with great 
enthusiasm (which I share) about Uexküll’s appreciation of the umwelt—the subjective rather 
than the objective world. The city park is a different place for the foraging squirrel than for the 
strolling urbanite. Perception is subject-relative. But can’t there be a science of umwelten—of 
species-specific perceptual filters that are attuned to the adaptation problems faced by each 
species? I assume the answer to this question is yes, as admirably demonstrated by a century of 
research in ethology. But, it is crucial to realize that Uexküll was writing about filters that were 
both species-specific and species-typical—all hungry squirrels would see the same park. In effect, 
to use Fodor’s terminology, Uexküll was writing about input modules. When it comes to human 
beings, species typicality is lost, at least if Fodor is right about central systems. Each of us brings 
a different history and a different agenda to a particular situation—perceptual or judgmental—
with the result that, as with science, we can perhaps make sense of things after the fact, but we 
can’t expect to find law-like generalizations that will enable us to predict before the fact.  Felin et 
al (2017) may be right about how visual perception (and judgment and decision) actually work, 
but they fail to appreciate, I think, how high the stakes are in accepting their view of the world. 
They write enthusiastically about Uexküll, perhaps without fully appreciating that his species-
typical subjectivity is different from their own claims about individually idiosyncratic 
subjectivity. 
 
Laboratory settings are created to simplify the complex, establish precise control of the 
conditions, and keep out the “extraneous.” The presumption here is that successful laboratory 
settings will reveal pieces of what might be a complex process clearly and unambiguously in a 
way that would never be possible outside the laboratory. The analytic tool of the laboratory 
experiment has probably done more to enable scientific progress than any other aspect of 
scientific activity (see Horton, 1957, for an argument that the experiment is what most 
distinguishes scientific thought from folk-traditional thought). The presumption that justifies the 
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experimental approach is that if one can take complex things apart in the laboratory, it is a small 
step (though one rarely taken in practice) to put them back together outside the laboratory. But if 
my interpretation of Felin et al (2017) is correct, the task of putting things back together is neither 
small nor unproblematic. As Bennis, Medin, and Bartels (2010) put it, the world of the laboratory 
is a “closed system,” whereas the world we actually live in is an “open system.” What works in a 
closed system may not work in an open one, and what seems like an error in a closed system may 
be the best people can do in an open one. Consider again, for example, the effects of frames and 
mental accounts in decision making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1999; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). Framing and mental accounting effects are often regarded as cognitive 
shortcomings, as “mistakes.” But rational decision-making might be essentially impossible 
without such frames and accounts (Schwartz, 1986). Decision frames come into their own in open 
systems. If Fodor’s discussion of what central systems are and how they operate is roughly 
correct, then we will never understand them by creating an environment, like the laboratory, that 
distorts their fundamental nature.  
 
The possibilities I raise here could apply quite broadly in psychology. As Gergen (1973) pointed 
out many years ago, in a paper aptly titled “Social Psychology As History,” many of the 
phenomena that psychologists are most interested in understanding might be largely the province 
of Quinean and isotropic central systems. 
 
In this time of “fake news” and “alternative truth,” I do not want to be understood as suggesting, 
nihilistically, that we can never really know anything. We can know plenty, and science has 
found out a great deal about the things it studies, if not so much about itself. A key reason for the 
progress that science makes, I believe, is not that science trains its practitioners to see the world 
as it is. No, I suspect that scientists are just as prone to effects of framing, context, and aspirations 
as anyone else. What makes science capable of real progress, I think, is that it is public. The 
community of scientists, in public conversation, corrects the “biases” and “illusions” that each of 
them has as individuals. Public science makes progress by means of what has been called “the 
wisdom of crowds” (Surowiecki, 2004)—in this case, highly trained crowds.  Like proverbial 
blind men feeling around the parts of an elephant, scientists, like the rest of us, if not blind, are at 
least a little myopic. They rely on their colleagues to save them from embarrassment, or worse. 
 
In his very thoughtful book, Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle, Stephen J. Gould (1987) distinguished 
between processes in nature that are repeatable (“time’s cycle”) and processes that are historical 
(“time’s arrow”). Gould regarded the theory of evolution as the paradigm case of a science that is 
essentially historical. As an enthusiastic contributor to geology and evolutionary science, Gould 
was hardly suggesting that because it was historical, evolutionary theory could not be scientific. 
What he was suggesting, however, was that to capture evolutionary processes, we needed a 
different model of science than the one handed down by physics. We needed explanation, not 
prediction. Exactly the same might be true when it comes to understanding the operation of the 
central system. And this is what I take to be the broadest implication of the Felin et al (2017) 
argument. Where does that leave psychology? Not like physics, perhaps, but the science of 
psychology could do much worse than ending up as a science with the explanatory power of the 
theory of evolution. 
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PERCEIVING RATIONALITY CORRECTLY 
 
Keith Stanovich 
 
No important conclusions about rational thought depend on issues of perceptual theory at the 
level dealt with in this essay.  It is true that several important theorists in the heuristics and biases 
literature have used analogies with perception to facilitate the understanding of cognitive biases.  
The perceptual examples used by Kahneman and others were used to highlight certain cognitive 
biases, but the implications of the heuristics and biases work for the study of rationality in no way 
depends on any theory of the visual illusions that were used.  The arguments about human 
decision making that have formed the heart of the Great Rational Debate (GRD) in cognitive 
science (Cohen, 1981; Stanovich, 1999; Stein, 1996; Tetlock & Mellers, 2002) stand or fall on 
their own, independent of developments at this extremely abstract level of perceptual theory. 
 
The authors themselves, on page 14, say that “our arguments about perception may seem abstract 
and perhaps far removed from practical concerns about the study of rationality.”  I couldn't agree 
more.  These arguments about perception are indeed abstract.  They are indeed far removed from 
practical concerns about the study of rationality.  This far-fetched link between the literature on 
rational thinking and the literature at an abstract level of perceptual theory seems to be employed 
here only to provide a seemingly new rationale for the authors to launch a largely redundant 
critique of the heuristics and biases literature. 
 
It is a redundant critique because many of these criticisms have arisen and been dealt with 
throughout the last three decades of work on heuristics and biases tasks and the critiques of them.  
The Felin, Koenderink, and Krueger essay is backwards looking in that it revives old debates that 
have been resolved for some time now.  The answers to virtually all of these criticisms are 
contained in the GRD synthesis that has been used in the field for over a decade.  
 
That synthesis derives from works well into their second decade now, including, in chronological 
order: Stanovich (1999 2004), Stanovich and West (2000), Kahneman and Frederick (2002), and 
Samuels and Stich (2004).  The synthesis relies on contemporary dual-process theory (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011).  It also relies on two decades worth of work on individual 
differences in rational thought (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2016). 
 
The synthesis follows from interpreting the responses primed by Type 1 and Type 2 processing as 
reflecting conflicts between two different types of optimization—fitness maximization at the 
subpersonal genetic level and utility maximization at the personal level.  The synthesis 
acknowledges a point that the critics of the heuristics and biases literature have stressed: that 
evolutionary psychologists have often shown that the adaptive response on a particular task is the 
modal response on the task—the one that most subjects give.  However, that data pattern must be 
reconciled with another finding often obtained: that lower cognitive ability is often associated 
with the response deemed adaptive on an evolutionary analysis (Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & 
West, 2000; Stanovich et al., 2016).  The synthesis of the GRD referred to above argues that the 
evolutionary interpretations do not impeach the position of the heuristics and biases researchers 
that the alternative response given by the minority of (more cognitively able) subjects is rational 
at the level of the individual.  Subjects of higher analytic intelligence are simply more prone to 
override Type 1 processing in order to produce responses that are epistemically and 
instrumentally rational.  
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A point repeatedly made from within the GRD consensus position is that both Type 1 and Type 2 
processing lead to rational responses most of the time.  Thus, most of the time, outputs from the 
two systems are in sync and there is no conflict.  The controversy that spawned the GRD from the 
beginning was the invention of heuristics and biases tasks that primed two different responses, 
one from each of the systems. The assumption behind the current GRD synthesis is that the 
statistical distributions of the types of goals being pursued by Type 1 and Type 2 processing are 
different.  The greater evolutionary age of some of the mechanisms underlying Type 1 processing 
accounts for why it more closely tracks ancient evolutionary goals (that is, the genes’ goals) than 
does Type 2 processing, which instantiates a more flexible goal hierarchy that is oriented toward 
maximizing overall goal satisfaction at the level of the whole organism.  Because Type 2 
processing is more attuned to the person’s needs as a coherent organism than is Type processing 
1, in the minority of cases where the outputs of the two systems conflict, people will be better off 
if they can accomplish a system override of the Type 1-triggered output (Stanovich, 2004). The 
response triggered by System 2 is the better statistical bet in such situations and that is why it 
correlates with cognitive ability.  
 
What I am calling the GRD synthesis reconciles most of the debates between the heuristics and 
biases researchers and their critics.  The GRD synthesis has been around for quite some time now, 
and has been reiterated in the literature many times.  This is why it is surprising to see some of 
the same old shopworn issues coming up again in this essay.  The authors keep reiterating the 
point that heuristics (Type 1 processing) are useful most of the time, often give the normative 
response, and that they are adaptively efficient (“many of the seeming biases have heuristic value 
and lead to better judgments and outcomes” p. 14, “the vast amount of decision making that 
humans get right receives little attention” p. 16, “apparent biases might be seen as rational and 
adaptive heuristics” p. 16). But, as noted previously, dual-process theorists have been at pains to 
state that Type 1 processing is efficacious most of the time and that reliance on Type 1 processing 
does not always lead to error.  Evans and I pointed out that the equation of Type 1 processes with 
all bad thinking and Type 2 processes with correct responding is the most persistent fallacy in the 
history of dual process theory (now reaching its fortieth anniversary; Posner & Snyder, 1975; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Wason & Evans, 1975).  Likewise, the early originators of the 
heuristics and biases research tradition consistently reiterated that Type 1 processing modes often 
lead to normative responding and efficient task performance (Kahneman, 2000, 2011). The GRD 
synthesis long ago gave up this fallacy, so it is surprising to see it reiterated so often here, or used 
to create a strawman in statements like “the human susceptibility to priming and sensitivity to 
salient cues is not prima facie evidence of irrationality”  (p. 16).  Of course System 1 priming is 
not prima facie evidence of irrationality!  No dual-process theorist has ever made this claim.  All 
of the early dual-process theorists (Posner, Shiffrin, see above) assumed priming in the human 
brain was efficacious, as have all subsequent theorists. 
 
Other critiques in this essay likewise seem to take us backward to old issues long resolved.  The 
end of the essay reads like a Panglossian litany.  In the GRD literature, a Panglossian is the type 
of theorist who tries to close every gap between the descriptive and the normative that is revealed 
by empirical research (Stanovich, 1999, 2004; Stein, 1996).  Such a theorist has many options.  
First, instances of reasoning might depart from normative standards due to performance errors 
(temporary lapses of attention and other sporadic information processing mishaps).  Second, there 
may be computational limitations that prevent the normative response.  Third, in interpreting 
performance, we might be applying the wrong normative model to the task.  Alternatively, we 
may be applying the correct normative model to the problem as set, but the subject might have 
construed the problem differently and be providing the normatively appropriate answer to a 
different problem. 
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All of these (random performance errors, computational limitations, incorrect norm application, 
and alternative problem construal) are alternative explanations that avoid ascribing subpar 
rationality to a response—and they have all been extensively discussed in the literature.  But 
numerous theorists have warned that it is all too easy to use the alternative interpretations in an 
unprincipled, cherry-picked way that makes Panglossianism unfalsifiable.  Rips (1994) warns that 
"a determined skeptic can usually explain away any instance of what seems at first to be a logical 
mistake" (p. 393).  Kahneman (1981) argues that Panglossians seem to recognize only two 
categories of errors, “pardonable errors by subjects and unpardonable ones by psychologists” (p. 
340).  Referring to the four classes of alternative explanation discussed above—random 
performance errors, computational limitations, alternative problem construal, and incorrect norm 
application—Kahneman notes that Panglossians have “a handy kit of defenses that may be used if 
subjects are accused of errors: temporary insanity, a difficult childhood, entrapment, or judicial 
mistakes—one of them will surely work, and will restore the presumption of rationality” (p. 340).   
 
In short, the toolkit of the Panglossian is too large and too prone to be applied in an unprincipled 
manner.  For years, theorists have pointed to the need for principled constraints on the alternative 
explanations of normative/descriptive discrepancies.  Our own work on individual differences 
(Stanovich et al., 2016; Toplak et al., 2011; West et al., 2008) was originally motivated by the 
need to provide such principled constraints (Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000).  Yet the critiques in 
the last three pages of this essay simply proceed as if these debates had not occurred and already 
generated a research literature—almost as if we were back in the time of Cohen (1981), at the 
root of the Great Rationality Debate.  As if this were a new insight, we are repeatedly warned 
about alternative construals: 
 
“Furthermore, this alternative theory needs to recognize that many of the simplistic tests 
of rationality omit important contextual information and also do not recognize that even 
simple stimuli, cues, and primes can be interpreted in many different ways”  (p. 14) 
“There is a large variety of stimuli that could be pointed to (and proven) but missed by 
human subjects in the lab or in the wild. But these types of findings can be interpreted in 
a number of different ways” (p. 15) 
As if this were a new insight, we are repeatedly warned about alternative norms: 
“granting scientists themselves an all-seeing position—against which human decision 
making is measured. The conventional and even ritualistic use of this null hypothesis has 
endowed it a normative force. Yet, repeated rejections of this null hypothesis are of 
limited interest or concern when the normative status of the theory is itself questionable”  
(p. 14) 
“Visual illusions reveal that multiple responses, or ways of seeing, are equally rational 
and plausible”  (p. 16) 
“we argue that even simple stimuli are characterized by indeterminacy and ambiguity. 
Perception is multistable, as almost any percept or physical stimulus—even something as 
simple as color or luminance (Koenderink, 2010)—is prone to carry some irreducible 
ambiguity and is susceptible to multiple different interpretations”  (p. 16) 
 
Unmentioned are the constraints on the alternative construals and alternative norms that have 
been empirically investigated in the years since Cohen (1981).  Also unmentioned is a fact that 
embarrasses many of these Panglossian critiques: Most subjects in heuristics and biases 
experiments retrospectively endorse the Bayesian and SEU norms that they violate.  That is, after 
responding—usually after failing to override the response that comes naturally (Kahneman, 
2003)—subjects choose the correct norm that they were led to violate (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982; Shafir, 1993, 1998; Shafir & Tversky, 1995; Thaler, 1987).  When shown the multiple 
norms that Felin et al stress repeatedly, subjects are more likely to endorse the Bayesian norm 
than alternatives (Stanovich & West, 1999).  In introducing the collection of Amos Tversky’s 
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writings, Shafir (2003) stresses this very point: “The research showed that people’s judgments 
often violate basic normative principles.  At the same time, it showed that they exhibit sensitivity 
to these principles’ normative appeal” (p. x).  For example, Koehler and James (2009) found that 
non-normative “probability matchers rate an alternative strategy (maximizing) as superior when it 
is described to them” (p. 123).  In short, when presented with a rational choice axiom that they 
have just violated in a choice situation, most subjects will actually endorse the axiom.  If people 
nevertheless make irrational choices despite consciously endorsing rational principles, this 
suggests that the ultimate cause of the irrational choices might reside in Type 1 processing and 
the miserly tendency not to override it with Type 2 processing. 
 
Consider framing effects and preference reversals, two of the most researched ways of 
demonstrating deviations from instrumental rationality (Kahneman, 2011; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 
2006).  In such problems, subjects often agree in post-experimental interviews that the two 
versions are identical and that they should not be affected by the wording.  In short, preference 
reversals or framing effects do not represent alternative contextualizations that subjects want to 
have.  Instead, such alternative construals represent mental contamination (Wilson & Brekke, 
1994) that the subjects would choose to avoid.  
 
The issue of post-experimental endorsement is just one way of employing the 
understanding/acceptance assumption in GRD—that more reflective and engaged reasoners are 
more likely to affirm the appropriate normative model for a particular situation (Slovic & 
Tversky, 1974; Stanovich & West, 1999). Subjects actively reflecting on the norms are more 
likely to indicate the norms they want to follow.  Likewise, individuals with cognitive/personality 
characteristics more conducive to deeper understanding are more accepting of the appropriate 
normative principles for a particular problem.  That is the result of the individual differences 
work I mentioned above.  
 
The authors keep reiterating that the extant literature emphasizes bias too much.  There is in fact 
no way to tell whether there has been too much emphasis on bias or too little.  To know that, 
someone would have to know the exact distribution of  benign and hostile environments a person 
must operate in and the exact costs and benefits of defaulting to Type 1 processing in every single 
environment (talk about omniscience!).  The point (extensively discussed by Kahneman, 2011) is 
that an attribute-substituting System 1 and a lazy System 2 can combine to yield rational behavior 
in benign environments but can yield seriously suboptimal behavior in hostile environments.  A 
benign environment is an environment that contains useful cues that, via practice, have been well 
represented in System 1.  Additionally, for an environment to be classified as benign, it must not 
contain other individuals who will adjust their behavior to exploit those relying only on System 1 
heuristics.  In contrast, a hostile environment for Type 1 processing is one in which there are no 
cues that are usable by System 1 (causing the substitution of an attribute only weakly correlated 
with the true target).  Another way that an environment can turn hostile is if other agents discern 
the simple cues that are triggering the cognitive miser’s System 1—and the other agents start to 
arrange the cues for their own advantage (for example, advertisements, or the deliberate design of 
supermarket floorspace to maximize revenue). 
 
The Meliorist (see Stanovich, 1999, 2004) supporters of the heuristics and biases approach see 
that approach as ideally suited to studying cognition in the modern world.  The beguiling (but 
wrong) intuitive response in heuristics and biases tasks is viewed as a strength and not a 
weakness.  It is a design feature, not a bug.  Why?  Because the modern world is, in many ways, 
becoming hostile for individuals relying solely on Type 1 processing.  The Panglossian theorists 
have shown us that many reasoning errors might have an evolutionary or adaptive basis.  But the 
Meliorist perspective on this is that the modern world is increasingly changing so as to render 
those responses less than instrumentally rational for an individual.  Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) 
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long ago made the telling point that: “in a rapidly changing world it is unclear what the relevant 
natural ecology will be.  Thus, although the laboratory may be an unfamiliar environment, lack of 
ability to perform well in unfamiliar situations takes on added importance” (p. 82). 
 
Critics of the abstract content of most laboratory tasks and standardized tests have been 
misguided on this very point.  Evolutionary psychologists have singularly failed to understand the 
implications of Einhorn and Hogarth's warning.  They regularly bemoan the “abstract” problems 
and tasks in the heuristics and biases literature and imply that since these tasks are not like “real 
life” we need not worry that people do poorly on them.  The issue is that, ironically, the argument 
that the laboratory tasks and tests are not like “real life” is becoming less and less true.  “Life,” in 
fact, is becoming more like the tests!  Try arguing with your health insurer about a disallowed 
medical procedure, for example.  The social context, the idiosyncrasies of individual experience, 
the personal narrative—the “natural” aspects of Type 1 processing—all are abstracted away as 
the representatives of modernist technological-based services attempt to “apply the rules.”  
 
Unfortunately, the modern world tends to create situations where the default values of 
evolutionarily adapted cognitive systems are not optimal.  Modern technological societies 
continually spawn situations where humans must decontextualize information—where they must 
deal abstractly and in a depersonalized manner with information rather than in the context-
specific way of the Type 1 processing modules discussed by evolutionary psychologists.  The 
abstract tasks studied by the heuristics and biases researchers often accurately capture this real-
life conflict.  Likewise, market economies contain agents who will exploit automatic Type 1 
responding for profit (better buy that “extended warranty” on a $150 electronic device!).  This 
again puts a premium on overriding Type 1 responses that will be exploited by others in a market 
economy.  The commercial environment of a modern city is not a benign environment for a 
cognitive miser.  To the extent that modern society increasingly requires the Type 1 
computational biases to be overridden, then Type 2 overrides will be more essential to personal 
well-being.  
 
Evolutionary psychologists have tended to minimize the importance of the requirements for 
decontextualizing and abstraction in modern life (the “unnaturalness” of the modern world that in 
fact matches the “unnaturalness” of many laboratory tasks!).  For example, Tooby and Cosmides 
(1992) use the example of how our color constancy mechanisms fail under modern sodium vapor 
lamps, they warn that “attempting to understand color constancy mechanisms under such 
unnatural illumination would have been a major impediment to progress” (p. 73)—a fair enough 
point.  But what it misses is that if the modern world were structured such that making color 
judgments under sodium lights was critical to one’s well-being, then this would be troublesome 
for us because our evolutionary mechanisms have not naturally equipped us for this.  In fact, 
humans in the modern world are in just this situation vis-à-vis the mechanisms needed for fully 
rational action in highly industrialized and bureaucratized societies. 
 
Thus, the longstanding debate between the Panglossians and the Meliorists can be viewed as an 
issue of figure and ground reversal.  It is possible to accept most of the conclusions of the work of 
Panglossian theorists but to draw completely different morals from them.  For example, 
evolutionary psychologists want to celebrate the astonishing job that evolution did in adapting the 
human cognitive apparatus to the Pleistocene environment.  Certainly they are right to do so.  But 
at the same time, it is not inconsistent for a person to be horrified that a multi-million dollar 
advertising industry is in part predicated on creating stimuli that will trigger Type 1 processing 
heuristics that many of us will not have the disposition to override.  To Meliorists, it is no great 
consolation that the heuristics so triggered were evolutionarily adaptive in their day. 
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CUES, MINDS, AND EQUILIBRIA: RESPONSES AND EXTENSIONS 
 
Teppo Felin, Jan Koenderink and Joachim Krueger 
 
We are thrilled to receive thoughtful commentaries on our article from prominent scholars in 
psychology, cognitive science, decision science, and biology. The commentaries range from 
highly critical to broadly supportive. We welcome the opportunity to respond to these comments, 
and to highlight extensions and implications of our all-seeing eye argument as it applies to 
rationality, perception, and cognition.  
 
Space considerations unfortunately prohibit us from addressing the commentaries point-by-point. 
Thus we largely focus on the commentaries that raise fundamental concerns and counter-
examples to our argument (Chater and Oaksford, 2017; Funder, 2017; Gigerenzer, 2017; Nordli et 
al., 2017; Stanovich, 2017). However, we also make passing reference to the commentaries more 
favorable to our original argument (Noble, 2017; Schwartz, 2017). Our response is organized 
around three fundamental issues, namely, 1) the problem of cues, 2) what is the question? and 3) 
equilibria, $500 bills, and the axioms of rationality.  
 
The Problem of Cues 
 
Several commentaries argue that we either take our rationality and all-seeing eye argument too far 
or that the argument does not apply to their particular conception of rationality, cognition or 
judgment. Funder (2017) for example points to the situation construal literature and argues that 
situational analysis in fact allows scientists to objectively study perception—thus challenging our 
all-seeing eye argument. And Gigerenzer et al (Gigerenzer, 2017; Nordli, Todd and Gigerenzer, 
2017) argue that the all-seeing eye assumption does not pertain to the literature on heuristics and 
ecological rationality. We respectfully disagree with these views. 
 
A straightforward way to illustrate how the all-seeing eye plagues both the situation construal and 
the heuristics or ecological rationality literatures is to point to the theoretical primacy that is 
placed on “cues.” Cue-focused approaches necessarily imply an all-seeing eye. The focus on cues 
within these two theoretical traditions—though other cognitive and psychological theories could 
also be used as examples—makes them theories of perception as well. As we discussed in our 
original article, most theories of rationality and cognition tend to feature implicit meta-theories 
about perception and observation, and thus the underlying perceptual assumptions deserve careful 
scrutiny. We first discuss the situation construal literature, in conjunction with Funder’s 
commentary, and then discuss Gigerenzer et al’s commentary and the particular emphasis they 
place on cues, heuristics and ecological rationality. 
 
Funder and colleagues (e.g., Funder, 2016) build their model of situation construal on a general 
“model of situation perception” (see Figure 1 and Table 2: Rauthmann et al., 2014: 3, 10). The 
perceptual focus is evident in the focus on cues: the word “cue” is mentioned 92 times in a recent 
article introducing a taxonomy of situations (Rauthmann et al., 2014). What, then, are cues? For 
Funder and colleagues “situation cues are physical or objective elements that comprise the 
environment. They can be objectively measured and quantified” (Rauthmann et al., 2014: 4; cf. 
Funder, 2016). Cues represent the “composition of the situation” (Rauthmann et al., 2015: 364)—
the ecology or environment (cf. Pervin, 1978)—and include the following: “persons and 
interactions (Who?), objects, events, and activities (What?), and spatial location (Where?)” 
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(2014: 3).1 Funder argues that a situation can be captured from the bottom up, by surveying the 
observers or situational participants themselves and then using their “consensus”—that is, the 
averaged, modal or aggregate statistical responses (e.g., rank-order judgments of what the 
situation is about)—to arrive at the objective nature of the situation. The argument is that the 
collective responses of “socially competent observers” (Funder, 2016) will somehow reveal the 
objective nature of the situation. 
 
The situation construal argument is in fact an excellent example of the all-seeing eye argument—
the type of camera-like conception of perception and reality that we were concerned about in our 
original article. In the case of situation judgment, however, the all-seeing-ness is not constructed 
top-down (though top-down mechanisms are also allowed), but bottom-up, from individual 
observations and their aggregation. Individuals serve as observers—essentially, sensors or 
recorders—of cues from their environment, from which the objective situation is constructed. In 
other words, if enough eyes are on it, the world can be adequately, if not exhaustively, captured 
and represented. This is an instance of inverse optics (Marr, 1982), and an example of the world-
to-mind mapping we discussed in the target article. 
 
This background is important because in his commentary Funder uses the social-perception 
version of the inverse-optics logic to dispute our interpretation of the gorilla experiment (Simons 
and Chabris, 1999). Funder argues that the reality of the gorilla scene can “in principle” be 
“visually identified” by the subjects or a “detached observer.” He recognizes the challenge of 
capturing the scene completely, but nonetheless claims that “it can be done.” Funder suggests that 
the fact that we are able to, in our original article, point to any number of potential observations in 
the scene means that it is doable. He recognizes that some things are outside of human perception, 
but argues that “the portion of the environment susceptible to human observation is, for human 
purposes, a sufficient definition of reality.” Funder even argues that “to conclude otherwise is to 
undermine the foundations of science itself.” We will show, however, that no visual scene or 
situation can be exhausted in terms of its potential descriptions and representations, even that 
which sits within the human visual spectrum. We consider this to be a logical and scientific 
verity. Physical structure is always just that, structure, which is meaningless without some 
mechanism for creating salience or awareness. 
 
Before providing examples, we must address a fundamental misunderstanding evident in 
Funder’s commentary. He argues that our all-seeing eye argument somehow suggests “alternative 
facts” and that we’ve “give[n] up the attempt to seek truth.” Funder misinterprets us to be saying 
that nothing can objectively be said—or that anything can be said—about a given visual scene or 
situation; or that some descriptions can’t be privileged over others. Our precise point is the 
opposite, which is that a near infinite variety of things can objectively be said about or “read into” 
a scene or situation, and in fact many of these descriptions, depending on the problem and 
question at hand (see the next section titled: What Is the Question?), can be equally objective, but 
also contradictory. No amount of observation or aggregation of cues or observers, as Funder 
would have it—if theory-independent—will yield “the right” answer about a visual scene or 
situation.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Funder specifies that he is interested in cues of the “middle level of analysis” (Funder, 2016: 205)  – that 
is, not concrete details about, say, temperature or number of people involved in the situation, nor broad 
categories like a situation is, say, a party or meeting—but rather, “experientially salient aspects” of the 
situation. The problem here, as we will discuss, is that the mechanism behind perceptual salience or 
awareness is not provided.  
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Situations—just like visual scenes—are teeming with latent cues and possible realities, 
outstripping our ability to capture them in any conclusive way. To demand that we ought to be 
able to do this is the all-seeing eye argument. Suppose we surveyed the six actors involved in the 
staging of the Simons-Chabris (1999) gorilla experiment (passing the basketball to each other), 
along with surveying some number of external observers, to capture the objective nature of the 
situation. The literature that Funder points us toward argues that if we array observers to look at a 
scene or situation—that is, observers who are in situ (within the situation), juxta situm (around 
the situation), ex situ (outside the situation)—then from this we can coalesce the true, objective 
nature of what is happening (see Rauthmann, Sherman and Funder, 2015). The varied observers 
are treated as camera-like recorders and sensors, and their aggregate observations, perceptions, 
and construals will generate the truth. We might also use Funder’s taxonomy and catalogue of 
situational cues, persons and events to question the subjects (Rauthmann et al., 2014). The 
problem is the sheer volume of possible cues that one could attend to. To deal with this problem, 
Funder’s approach uses forced ranking as a mechanism for getting subjects to commit to the 
situation. However, the cues that any one observer may attend to is arbitrary, or perhaps simply 
primed through questions. But again, there are an indefinite number of cues available, each of 
which could, in theory, be attended to. It is impossible to attend to and process all of them. More 
importantly, how specifically do subjects know what is relevant? Even if observers or participants 
happen to attend to the same visual cues, these could legitimately be “read” and interpreted in any 
number of ways. Not “interpreted” in any postmodern sense, but simply in the sense that these 
visual cues or behaviors could mean different things. No aggregate questionnaire, impartial 
observation, recording or statistical procedure would yield the one objective scene or situation.  
 
To informally highlight this: imagine that two of the participants lightly bump into each other in 
the gorilla clip. This illustrates a number of issues. First, whether the other participants or external 
observers themselves actually “register” or see this, is important—for it to show up in Funder’s 
aggregate, composite characterization of the situation. But let’s assume they do. The second 
problem is that this bump may or may not be relevant. And third, the set of potential 
interpretations of the bump could be varied, leading to different construals, which, again, may or 
may not be captured in the overall nature of the situation. The bump may have, objectively and 
truly, been some form of bullying, or it may have been some form of joking or flirting—or just an 
accident. The same could be said for any number of other cues in the clip, such as the visual 
expressions or interactional glances of the participants. Anything could be relevant (and 
“obvious,” like the gorilla), and any one thing could legitimately be read a number of different 
ways. The important point is that the cues themselves don’t somehow signal and tell us whether 
they are relevant or not, and what they mean.  
 
Funder realizes that cues are mere “raw input” and need interpretation and processing. But no 
mechanism of salience and awareness is given. The problem is that the situations literature that 
Funder’s commentary points us toward is unavoidably also a theory of perception, though one 
that suffers from all the problems of the all-seeing eye, as the approach features no explicit theory 
of salience or awareness.  
 
In their commentaries Gigerenzer et al (Gigerenzer, 2017; Nordli, Todd and Gigerenzer, 2017) 
claim that “ecological rationality needs no all-seeing eye” However, the strong focus on cues in 
this literature suggests otherwise. To illustrate, in a highly cited review of the heuristics and 
ecological rationality literature (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; also see Dhami et al., 2004; 
Luan et al. 2011) the word cue appears 92 times in the body of the article.2 Gigerenzer and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The pervasive focus on cues is also evident in discussions of specific heuristics as well, for example in a 
recent review of the “recognition heuristic” cue is referenced over one hundred times (Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein, 2011). 
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Gaissmaier’s specifically discuss cues in varied ways, including: cue weighting, the number of 
cues, the correlation of cues, cue validity, contradictory cues, cue addition, cue cleverness, the 
search through cues, positive cues, cue value, first cue, top cue, discriminant cues, cue ordering, 
cue redundancy, cue correlation, cue integration, cue combination, cue growth, cue favoring, 
relevant cues, and so forth. Of course, the fact that cues are frequently mentioned isn’t any kind 
of intellectual argument against this literature. However, it does place the arguments about 
heuristics squarely into the domain of perception—and we argue, the all-seeing eye.  
  
The literature on ecological rationality argues that in the presence of overwhelming amounts of 
environmental information (cf. Simon, 1990), humans and other organisms use heuristics to focus 
on what is essential and useful. A heuristic is defined as anything that allows organisms to—
adaptively and frugally—process and attend to the right cues and stimuli in their environments 
(cf. Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008), and to ignore other cues and information (Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier, 2011).  
 
Our concern with heuristics, and with ecological rationality in general, is that there is no clear 
theory about what a cue (or information) is and why certain cues might be selected, attended to 
and found to be “valid,” “weighted” or “ordered” in certain ways. Cues appear to just appear. 
From our perspective the focus on the right (or useful) cues is certainly an improvement over 
psychological and behavioral models that emphasize veridicality and some form of inherent cue 
salience (e.g., Kahneman’s “natural assessments”; also see Schwartz’s discussion of “what you 
see is all there is”). But the model of ecological rationality fails to provide a theory of salience 
itself, that is, why organisms might be aware of or care about particular cues. The right cues are 
simply given. Saying that attention to the right cues represents a heuristic does not explain why 
these cues are selected. Thus we might provocatively conclude that heuristics merely give the 
perceptual problem a new name, rather than explaining it.  
 
Gigerenzer et al acknowledge that species-specific factors are important (Gigerenzer, 2017; 
Nordli et al., 2017), and presumably these factors play a role in cue salience and selection. But 
these factors appear to be immaterial to their theory, as illustrated by their generic gaze heuristic 
and recognition heuristics (Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 2011). Gigerenzer et al 
postulate that heuristics have evolutionary origins, thus suggesting very long-run, universal 
mechanisms—such as natural selection—determine which cues organisms attend to. This 
evolutionary argument allows them to make general claims; as they say, “ecological rationality 
proposes cross-species commonalities” and “organism-general selection pressures” (Nordli et 
al.). We concur with them that all organisms exist in environments and are prone to selective 
pressures. But we consider it essential to consider and study the particular environments (or 
Umwelten) in which species operate. Organism-general model are ill-suited to explain the objects 
of interest, salience and contents of awareness, with life or death consequences for many 
organisms. Thus heuristics do not tell us anything about the underlying, more proximate, 
organism-specific and cognitive mechanisms that play a role in perceptual awareness and 
salience.  
 
The reason we highlighted von Uexküll’s comparative work is that it provides a window into 
organism-specific rather than organism-general environments. Most of the commentators—Nordli 
et al, Gigerenzer, Noble, and Schwartz—indeed seem to agree that Uexküll’s idea of a species’ 
Umwelt is a useful way of thinking about these organism-specific factors that shape perception. 
On the surface, this idea of Umwelt may even seem congruent with something like ecological 
rationality, or perhaps even situational construal (Funder, 2016).  
 
However, in our original article we neglected to discuss Uexküll’s specific mechanism that 
directs perception (cf. Noble, 2017)—the type of mechanism that is missing in both the situation 
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construal and in the heuristics and ecological rationality literatures. That is, the way that 
organisms attend to their unique surroundings or Umwelt is guided by species-specific 
Suchbilder—that is, a representation or schema of what is being looked for and what might be 
selected as the answer or solution. It is this Suchbild that directs perception toward the awareness, 
generation and finding of certain cues, such as relevant objects or, say, sources of food. For 
example, many species of frog will not recognize a fly directly in front of them unless it moves.  
 
All-seeing models of rationality abstract away from these specifics, preferring to deal with cues 
themselves or various types of universal search (e.g., Gershman et al., 2015). Gigerenzer et al’s 
emphasis on “cross-species commonalities, “organism-general factors” and taken-for-granted 
cues makes precisely this point. The idea of heuristics is so interwoven with cues themselves 
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011) that the directedness of perception is sidelined (see next 
section for further discussion). The various, universal or general search rules—for example, 
“search through cues in order of their validity,” “search through cues in predetermined order,” 
“search through cues in any order”—don’t provide us with any form of specificity. Even the idea 
that “search rules specify in what direction the search extends in the search space” doesn’t make 
sense without some kind of problem, question, or Suchbild. It is worth noting that we do not 
object to the term ‘heuristic,’ per se. Rather, we think that alternative conceptualizations of 
heuristics could be conducive to the idea of Suchbild, which could thereby resolve the all-seeing 
eye problem. For example, Michael Polanyi uses a Suchbild-friendly notion of heuristic when he 
argues that “the simplest heuristic effort is to search for an object you have mislaid”—in other 
words, as discussed in our original article, we attend to the world with some form of directed 
“readiness to perceive” (1957: 89, 94). Organisms similarly approach situations and visual scenes 
with some kind of problem or question in mind, and an associated image of the potential answer 
or solution, which then directs our observation and perception. We next turn our attention to this. 
 
What Is the Question? 
 
Our central argument in the original article is that perception is directed, and that this matters for 
our understanding of mind, cognition, and rationality. Perception does not make sense without a 
focus on directedness. Any scene, situation, or environment features an infinite variety of cues, 
stimuli and potential facts. Organisms “cut through” all this potential clutter by directing 
themselves toward the cues that are relevant to a specific problem at hand, or put differently, they 
attend to those cues that are relevant for answering particular questions. Some cues are important 
and relevant for some purposes, and those very cues might be irrelevant for other purposes—
depending on the question. Our commentators might largely agree with this. But as we discuss 
below, the theories that they point toward do not address the directedness of perception, that is, 
the mechanisms behind perceptual awareness and salience. To speak of any form of rationality 
and cognition requires that we offer a theoretical approach to this directedness, rather than 
placing our emphasis on cues or heuristics themselves.    
 
Cues are consequences of questions, problems and theories, which drive cue salience and 
awareness. To illustrate this idea, Karl Popper once conducted a playful thought experiment 
during a public lecture. He asked his audience to simply “observe” their surroundings:  
 
My experiment consists of asking you to observe, here and now. I hope you are all 
cooperating and observing! However, I feel that at least some of you, instead of 
observing, will feel a strong urge to ask: “WHAT do you want me to observe?” For what 
I am trying to illustrate is that, in order to observe, we must have in mind a definite 
question, which we might be able to decide by observation (1967: 259, emphasis in the 
original).  
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Notice how Popper’s lecture hall is much like Funder’s social situation (cf. Funder, 2016; 
Rauthmann et al., 2016) where we can presumably, “in principle,” capture what is around us: a 
lecture hall, fellow audience members, curtains, a pulpit and any number of other facts. Observers 
could respond to a battery of questions and report what the situation is about. But latent and 
potential cues abound and surpass any ability (or reasonable desire) to fully describe them. For 
example, we could capture any number of observations about any number of the attendees, 
perhaps survey them to see what they observed. Even saying that the situation is largely about 
this or that is problematic. As Popper notes, there is no pure perception or observation, as 
observation is always theory-laden: “observation comes after expectation or hypothesis.” In other 
words, “we learn only from our hypotheses what kind of observations we ought to make: whereto 
we ought to direct our attention: wherein to take interest.” The world is neutral. But there is no 
neutral observation of the world. 
 
Without the questions and problems that organisms bring to tasks, a focus on cues and 
environments makes no sense. Organisms always attend to scenes and situations actively looking 
for something—rather than passively recording or absorbing stimuli. We come to encounters with 
reality with something in mind: with expectations, hypotheses, questions, and theories. This is the 
human equivalent of the aforementioned Suchbild. Focusing on questions and the directedness of 
perception makes the notion of attention superfluous. 
 
One way to illustrate the importance of problems and questions—and their relevance in directing 
perception in situations and environments—is to think about this process as a form of forensic 
problem solving and investigation (cf. Koenderink, 2012). A thought experiment might help 
make the point. Imagine that someone is found murdered in the aforementioned lecture hall, 
directly after the lecture, just as audience members are getting up from their seats and exiting the 
venue. This represents a situation where all manner of environmental cues could be gathered as 
evidence for what happened and who the culprit might be. We could begin the analysis by listing 
and capturing all the objective facts on the scene: people and motives, interviews of audience 
members (reporting sundry observational fragments), security camera footage or photographs, 
seating charts or arrangements, visits to the restroom, bank accounts, relationships, smoldering 
cigar butts outside the back entrance, wine stains on desks, crumpled papers with scribbles, 
incoming and outgoing text messages, and overwhelming amounts of microfibers and potential 
DNA evidence—in short, an infinitely structured environment and landscape. The problem is that 
there is no end to what could be captured, but more importantly, there is no end to what might be 
relevant and counted as evidence. (Incidentally, just as there is no end to the facts that might be 
relevant in the gorilla scene.) Much of this amassing of cues, observations, facts and evidence 
would involve within-situation and scene-related data and facts. But the scope of potential cues 
and observations would undoubtedly also include a wild array of facts and observations external 
to this particular scene, situation and environment. For example, interviews of audience members 
may yield the observation that a particular pair of individuals were seen—corroborated by a 
number of people (Funder’s competent observers: whether in situ or ex situ: Rauthmann et al., 
2015)—to be interacting during the lecture break, and that these individuals were also seen 
together by several witnesses at a café the day prior to the murder, observed by one witness to be 
whispering to each other. These are objective facts. But they are just data and facts—perhaps 
relevant to the case, perhaps not.  
 
The problem is that all of these objective cues and facts don’t themselves actually tell us 
anything. (Note that the same goes for the Simons-Chabris (1999) gorilla experiment and scene 
that we discussed in our original article.) The question is: how do we process this or any other 
situation or scene? Cues and facts inherently do not somehow signal their meaning and relevance 
in any way. There is no obviousness. And the objective cues and facts that are present could tell 
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us any number of things. Furthermore, any number of cues could objectively be amassed to point 
to any number of audience members as the culprit. Anything could be relevant.  
 
Now consider how this hypothetical scenario and situation might be approached from a 
perspective of ecological rationality. The theory, after all, is about evaluation, processing and 
rationality, and as reiterated in two of the commentaries (Gigerenzer, 2017; Nordli et al., 2017), 
about judgment and decision making under uncertainty. The problem is that we are immediately 
stuck with needing to define the concept of cues. In our hypothetical scenario the potential cues 
and facts are innumerable, as Gigerenzer et al would surely agree. But the valid, right, redundant 
or weighted cues don’t somehow emerge and array themselves, even though that is precisely what 
heuristics are supposed to do. And if we look at the “content” of heuristics, they provide no 
further guidance for how to process the scene and situation. Heuristics are by definition 
constituted by various generic search rules for cues (see the discussion of “search through cues:” 
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). In other words, the literature assumes that organisms 
somehow go straight to the correct cues, and that they “search through cues in order of their 
validity”(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer and 
Todd, 1999) or “examine cues in the order of their accuracy” (Luan, Schooler and Gigerenzer, 
2014). But saying that we should “search through cues in order of their validity” begs the 
question of what the relevant cues might be.3 Uncertainty is presumed to be reduced through cue-
related factors such as “cue redundancy and correlation, the number of observations and cues, and 
cue weights” (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011: 457). But again, none of the particular 
heuristics—whether the gaze heuristic or recognition heuristic—offers guidance about salience or 
awareness, as each takes cues (and their weights, numbers and comparisons) as a given.  
 
Our view is that questions—not the nature or structure of cues, or even heuristics—reduce 
uncertainty and tell us what to direct our perception and observations toward. The mechanism 
that allows an organism to arrive at cues is a Suchbild-like question, not a heuristic that 
automatically arrays or searches through cues. This distinction is critical. It fundamentally 
changes the nature of the problem from one of having to deal with overwhelming amounts of 
information and stimuli—the so-called problem of attention—to one where questions direct 
awareness toward what even might count as a cue (or “clue”), and what is salient and relevant.  
The emphasis on questions also changes the perceptual problem from one focused on attention to 
one focused on awareness, a central distinction. 
 
To return to our thought experiment in the lecture hall, we propose that this situation is best 
approached with a set top-down guesses, expectations, conjectures, hypotheses, and theories that 
we impose on it. A prototypical detective like Sherlock Holmes operates in this fashion. Rather 
than amass reams of observational detail, facts and seeming evidence, gathering everything in 
sight—an impossible task—the investigation starts with some kind of hypothetical plot. Initial 
hunches, observational scraps, and hypotheses about who the culprit might be direct the 
observations of the detective to those cues (or clues) that might be relevant. As suggested by 
Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock, for others the problem “lay in the fact of there being too much 
evidence”—that is, any number of things could constitute relevant evidence. But Sherlock 
operates with a type of Suchbild that creates salience and helps generate relevant cues, that is, 
questions direct observation to those cues or facts that are relevant to the situation at hand. Note 
that this is not done on the basis of any kind of algorithm that tallies, weights or counts cues in 
some fashion (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). There is no generic “Sherlock heuristic” for 
arraying or processing cues. Of course, the method of posing questions and problems, and letting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Interestingly, the distinction between “searching for” versus “searching through” cues is quite important 
here. Though it is informative, and for us problematic, that the emphasis seems to be on the latter 
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). 
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conjectures and hypotheses drive observation and perception is not infallible. In our hypothetical 
situation, investigators will undoubtedly be lead down a number of blind allies and focus 
attention on irrelevant facts. But the cognitive or organism-specific factors are what drive this 
activity—and subsequent revisions of the underlying theory lead to success. We see this type of 
forensic investigation as a powerful metaphor for the more general problem of explaining 
perception, cognition and rationality as well. 4  
 
Note the parallel between our hypothetical thought experiment and the gorilla experiment 
(Simons and Chabris, 1999). Our central point is that with any visual scene or environment we 
are always looking for something, and therefore necessarily ignoring any number of other things 
that are present. The problem thus—pace Gigerenzer et al—is not so much about attention or the 
amount of potential information, but rather how questions and theories direct our observation to 
the relevant facts. Thus even the very idea of trying to characterize environments through various 
taxonomies—as “hostile” (Stanovich, 2017) or as having “high or low uncertainty” or cue 
redundancy (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011)—doesn’t make sense, as the nature of 
environments is fundamentally tied to the organisms, Suchbilder, problems and questions at hand. 
From our perspective, the central matters related to perception, cognition and rationality have to 
do with the organism and the question, rather than the environment. A Suchbild provides the 
question (how many basketball passes?), which in turn serves as the prime toward the relevant 
cues. If we are primed to count basketball passes, we’ll attend to these, at the “expense” of other 
factors. But to say that missing the gorilla illustrates that the human mind is “blind to the 
obvious” (Kahneman, 2011: 23-24)—or even the idea that visual scenes or situations can “in 
principle” be exhaustively or even partially be represented (Funder)—misspecifies the nature of 
both perception and reality. All-seeing ideas miss the directed nature of perception and the 
multifarious nature of reality and how problems, questions and theories direct our awareness and 
selection of particular cues. Any visual scene is infinitely structured, and thus only with plots and 
questions do facts look obvious—particularly in retrospect—and any fact of course, depending on 
the question at hand, could have multiple meanings and relevances.5   
 
Equilibria, $500 Bills, and the Axioms of Rationality 
 
The final set of comments focus on the nature of equilibria, as they relate to perception and the 
all-seeing eye argument, and the idea of the axioms of rationality. We discuss each in turn. 
 
In their commentary Chater and Oaksford argue that our all-seeing eye argument may have some 
limited application to rational “functionalist” explanation, but that our arguments do not apply to 
equilibrium-based analysis and explanations in economics (and related domains). We find Chater 
and Oaksford’s claim surprising, as the very premise of the cognitive and psychological critique 
of economics (Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 1978; for a review see Thaler, 2016) is that equilibrium 
analysis assumes agent omniscience and rationality (cf. Buchanan, 1959; Kirman, 1992)—an all-
seeing eye. But given Chater and Oaksford’s commentary, clearly some further discussion is 
needed. It is important for us to show that arguments about the nature of perception and 
observation are not just tangentially related to equilibrium analysis, but that they are foundational 
to the theoretical, empirical, and mathematical framework of economics. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Of course, not just forensic investigation, but science itself can be discussed in terms of how questions, 
hypotheses, and theories drive observation and perception (e.g., Bell, 1990; Peirce, 1955; Polya, 1954; 
Popper, 1969). 
5 We might here conclude and concur with Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock by saying that “there is nothing 
more deceptive than an obvious fact.” Thus the gorilla (Simons and Chabris, 1999)—“obvious” to 
Kahneman (2011)—is only obvious if relevant to a set of questions and theories. 
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The strong assumption behind equilibrium analysis is that any unique information is already 
priced into assets, stocks or resources, and thus there are no meaningful arbitrage opportunities. 
Markets are assumed to be efficient. The observations of many profit-maximizing/seeking agents 
remove any possibility of finding value. Economists frequently make this point by using the 
example of a hypothetical $500 bill on the sidewalk: “there are no $500 bills on the sidewalk; if 
there had been, someone would have already taken them” (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985: 708-709; 
also see Frank and Bernanke, 2003). If agents happen to (randomly) stumble onto any 
opportunities, these are quickly snapped up. What might look like an opportunity should be 
treated suspiciously, as equilibrium theories assume that opportunities are obvious and thus self-
eradicating (Ball, Mankiw and Romer, 1988; Olson, 1996; cf. Fisman and Sullivan, 2016). This 
strong version of efficient markets and equilibrium has of course been softened and relaxed, 
allowing for agents to adapt, search and learn (e.g., Bray and Savin, 1986; Lucas, 1986), 
including the use of Bayesian approaches and models (e.g., Aumann, 1987). But the central 
assumption remains that any “$500 bill”-type arbitrage opportunities are quickly seen—given 
learning and enough eyeballs—and competed away. Thus the essential equilibrium architecture of 
economics, with some minor amendments, remains firmly intact. It’s this model that Chater and 
Oaksford point toward. 
 
The equilibrium axiom of economics is a direct theoretical analogue to the perceptual problem we 
have discussed. The question is whether we can assume that the world (or reality) can—
perceptually or observationally—be exhausted and somehow fully described and represented. 
Equilibrium approaches, just like inverse optics and psychophysics, assume that this is possible. 
The world is assumed to feature various “obvious” objects and things—whether $500 bills on 
sidewalks or gorillas in visual scenes—and humans perceptually capture these facts into a full 
representation of the world. As discussed above, if subjects don’t see these “obvious” things, they 
are labeled irrational, blind, bounded or biased, which provides the underlying (for us 
problematic) foundation for much of behavioral economics (Kahneman, 2011; Thaler, 2016). 
From an equilibrium perspective, in its strongest form, the correct, full representation is expected 
to be held by every agent in god-like fashion (in the form of rational expectations; Sargent, 2015). 
Alternatively, the full representation is an emergent outcome of lots of agents “eyeing”—
scanning proverbial sidewalks for $500 bills—and interacting, and building up an aggregate, 
exhaustive conception of the world through aggregate information processing (Muth, 1961). The 
economic equilibrium is the all-seeing eye. 
 
The problem in the economic context, just as in the context of observing visual scenes, situations, 
or environments, is that no exhaustive representation is possible. The varied possible stimuli and 
cues don’t signal their own relevance. Economic agents do not encounter a world where 
obviousness or salience is somehow built into observations. Put differently, objects of relevance 
don’t (necessarily) have price tags telling us of their value, just as any given item in our visual 
scene is meaningless without some mechanism of awareness or salience—without a problem, 
question or theory. Thus the idea of price—the central construct of equilibrium analysis—can be 
seen as equivalent to Kahneman’s natural assessment (for example, “size, distance, and loudness” 
2003:1453), serving a similar function, exhausting or fully capturing reality. Both equilibrium 
and behavioral approaches assume this all-seeing eye, and lack underlying mechanisms to 
account for heterogeneity and the directedness of perception. Thus we disagree with Chater and 
Oaksford’s claim that equilibrium analysis does not feature an all-seeing eye. Instead, 
equilibrium-based approaches assume that observational obviousness reigns, which exhausts the 
potential for novelty and alternative uses.  
 
It is also here that Chater and Oaksford’s distinction between functional and equilibrium 
explanation fails. Equilibrium analysis assumes that the functional uses of assets are fully listable, 
and that all possible uses of objects are known and, in effect, priced in. This is the equivalent of 
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arguing that visual scenes can be exhaustively described, or that the affordances of objects (e.g., 
assets) can be fully accounted for (cf. Felin, Kauffman, Koppl, and Longo, 2014). But no camera 
or computation—nor any number of eyes observing or scanning—can fully capture a scene or 
situation, nor can it exhaust the set of uses and economic possibilities. The set of possible, 
functional “affordances” for any object are not listable. The problem of accounting for functional 
uses and affordances, though the perceptual foundations of this have not been explicitly pointed 
out, has also been noted across economic and biological environments (Kauffman, 2016; Noble, 
2016). This idea is also embedded in the criticisms that others have made about equilibrium 
analysis. For example, Frydman and Phelps argue that most equilibrium-based approaches 
represent “fully predetermined models” that “rule out the autonomous role of expectations” 
(Frydman and Phelps, 2001: 2). Sargent further notes that equilibrium-based approaches 
“preclude any heterogeneity of beliefs” (Sargent, 2015: 18). Finally, Edmund Phelps makes an 
even stronger claim that “the neoclassical idea of equilibrium has not illuminated how the world 
economy works” (2007: xv). We concur. And our argument is that the perceptual and 
observational assumptions—similar to inverse optics—behind equilibrium analysis are at fault. 
 
The all-seeing eye is also directly embedded in the mathematics used in equilibrium analysis in 
economics (see Arrow and Debreu, 1954; Muth, 1961; Samuelson, 1971; Walras, 1954; cf. 
Romer, 2016). Equilibria are modeled as state or phase spaces, building on similar models in 
physics (cf. Nolte, 2010). That is, economies or markets are represented with the tools of Euler-
Lagrangian or Hamiltonian-type phase spaces where agents, assets and their prices interact in a 
closed system, which can be exhaustively captured and computed. What these models represent is 
a form of Laplacean demon that automatically computes and searches through all possible states 
and spaces, exhausting and saturating them (cf. Noble, 2017). The market simply, in camera-like 
fashion, works and computes itself (cf. Coase, 1937). All agents are homogeneous, have the same 
information, allowing for no heterogeneity. Opportunities are obvious and given—just as reality 
is obvious and given. But just as we have a concern with exhaustive, all-seeing representations in 
the context of visual scene and situations, we have the same concerns relative to equilibrium 
analysis.  
 
Now, all that said, Chater and Oaksford argue that equilibrium analysis does not assume that 
agent perceptions necessarily need to match external reality, our all-seeing eye. Specifically, they 
argue that “no [all-seeing] characterization of the external world is required to make sense of 
rational equilibrium explanation, which depends purely on the coherence of internal elements of 
the system.” It’s this internality that we find problematic—particularly the exhaustive nature of it 
that is presumed, along with the strong assumptions that are made about agent omniscience. But 
beyond this, surely economists and social theorists are concerned about our lack of ability to 
anticipate and capture things like economic bubbles, which cannot be done with equilibrium 
approaches (Shiller, 2015).  
 
While Chater and Oaksford advocate equilibrium-based approaches, Stanovich makes broadly 
related arguments about the “axioms of rationality.” Stanovich argues that the issues raised by our 
all-seeing eye argument “have been solved for some time now,” and even suggests that none of 
our arguments about perception have any relevance to the “great rationality debate”—and 
particularly its synthesis—in cognitive science. To summarize, Stanovich’s rationality synthesis 
consists of the argument that biases pervade human decision-making and that our evolutionary 
past has not prepared us for the hostile and lab-like decision situations of the modern world. 
Stanovich argues that biases are pervasive, but his work also points out that there is variance 
amongst individuals in terms of their susceptibility to bias and their likelihood of matching the 
“axioms of rational choice.” Some individuals—due to “analytic intelligence” and “cognitive 
ability” (which overrides lazy type 1 processing)—behave according to the axioms of rational 
choice. Many do not. This has recently allowed Stanovich and colleagues to develop a so-called 
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“rationality quotient.” Stanovich claims that it is this approach—focused on the deviations from 
the axioms of rationality—which is “ideally suited to studying cognition in the modern world.” 
We respectfully disagree. 
 
To illustrate the problem we have with Stanovich’s axioms of rationality, consider an 
experimental setting where subjects play the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982). We could say 
that the rational response for the first player (the proposer) in the ultimatum game is to offer the 
minimum possible increment (for example, $1, if handed ten $1 bills by the experimenter) and 
that the second player’s (the responder) rational response is to accept anything that is offered; 
even one cent, as they clearly are better off. This is one axiom of rationality. And we could then 
show how some subjects are rational (as either proposers or responders), and then point out to 
poorly performing subjects—post experiment, as discussed by Stanovich in his commentary—
and highlight how they violate the norm of rationality. We could, in effect, secure what Stanovich 
calls “post-experimental endorsement” for the axiom from the subjects: that is, offers should be 
as low as possible and responders should accept any offer. But note that the axioms themselves 
are artificially constructed based on the ex ante hypotheses of the scientists, rather than telling us 
anything meaningful about rationality itself. All manner of axioms can be construed as rational. A 
deviation from the norm could have any number of reasons. What is rational in this context? For 
example, in some cultural settings it may be rational to propose splits that are higher than fifty 
percent (cf. Henrich et al., 2005) and to reject offers that are less than that. And any number of 
small tweaks to the experiment—blind versus face-to-face interaction, player matching (stranger 
versus friend), the type of social interaction or mode of communication that is allowed, single 
versus repeated games, iterative role reversals (proposer becomes responder)—could lead to 
wildly different outcomes. Now, perhaps this particular axiom of rationality (in case of the 
ultimate game: offer low, accept low) is one that Stanovich disagrees with. But this illustrates our 
point about the problem of defining axioms and norms, as they can vary wildly—reinforcing our 
original points about the multi-stability and multifaceted nature of rationality.  
 
As Stanovich points out, this type of discussion of many rationalities—as illustrated by the above 
ultimatum game—might illustrate his point that we are “Panglossians” (Kahneman, 1981). 
Panglossian explanations are ones that question axioms of rationality by pointing toward one of 
the following: random performance errors, computational limitations, incorrect norm application, 
or alternative problem construal. Here we concede. If it is Panglossian to say that we can come up 
with any number of alternative explanations (and axioms) for why individuals deviate from 
scientist-specified norms and answers (e.g., offering or accepting a minimum increment in an 
ultimatum game), norms and rationality (in essence, an all-seeing eye)—then yes: Panglossians 
we are. In short, we find the program of specifying axioms and then pointing out deviations to be 
highly problematic. 
 
What Stanovich seems to have in mind when speaking of the axioms of rationality is focused on 
varied computational or statistical reasoning tasks, where humans appear to fail routinely (and 
where there is significant variance). Our first concern is that making these tasks out to be the task 
of the rationality literature in the cognitive sciences is, from our perspective, extremely 
problematic (Stanovich et al., 2016: 1-14). But we’ll set that aside (also see Schwartz, 2017). The 
gist of this program of research is the identification of a host of axioms—see his “comprehensive 
assessment of rational thinking” (CART): Stanovich, 2016 and Stanovich et al., 2016—in specific 
domains such as probabilistic and statistical reasoning, scientific reasoning, probabilistic 
numeracy, rejection of anti-science attitudes, or rejection of superstitious thinking. And these 
tests then provide an aggregate score of how rational an individual is. Now, for delimited 
situations, this could be a worthwhile enterprise. However, many of these tests of reasoning—
carefully crafted and calibrated, often worked out by scientists over the years—are loaded and 
only show that the tests are difficult (Krueger and Funder, 2003), and they all too conveniently 
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align with the bias-focused priors of researchers. They fit the “mistakes are fun” school of 
psychological research. But at it’s worst these tests of rationality can be seen as an attempt to 
ensnarl unsuspecting experimental subjects into error, with the tests of rationality providing an 
arsenal of potential ways through which irrationality can be proven. To further compound the 
problem, scientists themselves can easily create mental contaminations (attributing these to 
subjects)—for example, by priming (as illustrated by the gorilla example)—to prove irrationality 
or bias. 
 
Some of the more striking claims that have emerged from this program of research are telling. For 
example, Stanovich points to the incongruence of human first- and second-order preferences (also 
see Chater and Oaksford above) and concludes that “humans are often less rational than bees in 
an axiomatic sense” (2013: 13). Stanovich clearly has a very specific, all-seeing conception of 
rationality in mind here. But if we compare humans and animals in this all-seeing sense, then the 
set of possible ways of showing irrationality indeed is innumerable. We could, for example, 
compare human and rat maze navigation. We don’t find this useful, nor in any way related to 
cognition and rationality. Our goal in the original article was to highlight species-specific 
factors—to understand the nature of the organism—rather than comparing the rationality of, say, 
bees and humans. We follow Tinbergen, who regarded the power of the comparative method as 
residing in the focus on species-specificity, rather than in trying to “formulate theories claimed to 
be general” (1963: 411). Some animals indeed appear to be “rational” at some tasks, and 
“irrational” at others. Though, making comparative claims about rationality is only an artifact of 
the all-seeing standards (and the derivative experiments) set up by scientists, rather than telling us 
anything of substance about rationality and cognition itself.  
 
What does all of this have to do with perception? After all, Stanovich argues that our article 
doesn’t say anything important about rationality: “no important conclusions about rational 
thought depend on issues of perceptual theory at the level dealt with in this essay.” The points 
made above, about the problematic nature of the axioms of rationality, hopefully shows just how 
important our arguments about perception are for the domain of rationality. But in terms of 
Stanovich’s commentary, here the specific link between perception and rationality has an 
important meta-theoretical component. If scientists begin with the prior that human rationality is 
biased, then this theoretical prior will guide the construction of experimental tests and subsequent 
observations toward finding this failure and error. Perception and observation are theory-laden.  
 
Stanovich notes that “there is in fact no way to tell whether there has been too much emphasis on 
bias or too little.” We certainly agree. Though it’s unclear how Stanovich then—in the very next 
paragraph—can simultaneously claim that: “unfortunately, the modern world tends to create 
situations where the default values of evolutionarily adapted cognitive systems are not optimal.” 
These two claims are incongruent. The latter statement is unverifiable. High-level, aggregate 
improvements in general human welfare, radical technological progress and any number of other 
metrics would suggest that Stanovich’s pessimism about the human mind is not warranted. And 
importantly, it seems that Stanovich’s own theoretical priors—or theoretical Suchbild—are 
driving his claims about rampant bias and his concerns about cognitively “hostile” environments. 
Much of the non-optimality that he observes is constructed in labs to suit the a priori expectations 
of scientists and their theories. Stanovich in fact, emphatically argues that “life is more and more 
lab-like,” and “life is becoming more like the tests!” This is a strong claim. But as Schwartz 
(2017) discusses in his commentary, “we will never understand [the mind] by creating an 
environment, like the laboratory, that distorts [its] fundamental nature.” What the lab masks, from 
our perspective, is that in the real world people self-select not just into situations, but they also (in 
effect) select into cues and primes (through questions and theories), rather than being randomly 
assigned into conditions (where they might be primed or mentally contaminated by factors such 
as, say, the color of an object or the temperature of the room). In the lab this type of self-selection 
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is purposefully avoided through random assignment, thus confounding the analysis and stacking 
the deck (through primes and questions) toward rational or irrational outcomes, depending on the 
scientists own theories. Thus we would argue that many of the experimental findings about 
rationality scarcely translate into the real world where people seem to muddle through just fine. 
Do individuals make mistakes? Absolutely. But many of these mistakes and irrationalities are 
artificially conjured in the lab, similar to the visual illusions and gorilla experiment that we 
discussed in our original article. In all, despite the devastatingly “hostile” cognitive environments 
outlined by Stanovich—and though problem undoubtedly abound—human societies nonetheless 
seem to be less violent and more prosperous than ever before (cf. Mokyr, 2002; Pinker, 2011).  
 
Conclusion 
 
We are thrilled about the opportunity to engage in this debate and interdisciplinary exchange of 
ideas about the nature of rationality, perception and cognition. Some of the commentaries are 
strongly critical of our arguments about perception and rationality, though some aspects of our 
all-seeing eye argument resonate (Noble, 2017; Schwartz, 2017). Undoubtedly scholars are likely 
to vehemently disagree on these matters, as is readily evident from the commentaries. From our 
perspective the commentaries illustrate just how pervasive the all-seeing eye assumption is, 
beyond the work of Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman. The assumption manifests itself in 
varied ways across psychology and cognitive science—including the situation construal literature 
(Funder, 2017), the literature on heuristics and ecological rationality (Nordli et al., 2017; 
Gigerenzer, 2017), functional and equilibrium analysis (Chater and Oaksford, 2017), and the 
literature on rationality and the psychology of reasoning (Stanovich, 2017). And beyond these 
literatures, the all-seeing eye is also the central assumption among many in philosophy (e.g., 
Block, 2015; Burge, 2010), vision science (e.g., Geisler, 2011, Ma 2012), computer science (e.g., 
Gershman et al., 2015) and economics (e.g., Frydman and Phelps, 2001; Muth, 1961; Thaler, 
2016). Perceptual assumptions tend to be deeply hidden within most theories, and of course 
deeply embedded in the very nature of empirical observation and science itself. Thus we hope 
that this debate and set of commentaries opens up further discussion and dialogue, which in turn 
will allow for productive theoretical and empirical investigations to further our understanding of 
rationality, mind and cognition across the sciences. 
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